GEOGRAPHY, TRADE, AND MACROECONOMICS by Guo, Hao
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Economics Economics 
2017 
GEOGRAPHY, TRADE, AND MACROECONOMICS 
Hao Guo 
University of Kentucky, hao.guo@uky.edu 
Author ORCID Identifier: 
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5963-9579 
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2017.328 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Guo, Hao, "GEOGRAPHY, TRADE, AND MACROECONOMICS" (2017). Theses and Dissertations--
Economics. 31. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_etds/31 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Economics by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Hao Guo, Student 
Dr. Josh Ederington, Major Professor 
Dr. Jenny Minier, Director of Graduate Studies 
GEOGRAPHY, TRADE, AND MACROECONOMICS
DISSERTATION
A dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of Business and
Economics at the University of
Kentucky
By
Hao Guo
Lexington, Kentucky
Co-Director: Dr. Josh Ederington, Professor of Economics
and Dr. Jenny Minier, Professor of Economics
Lexington, Kentucky 2017
Copyright© Hao Guo 2017
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
GEOGRAPHY, TRADE, AND MACROECONOMICS
This dissertation studies the effects of external integration and internal liberalization
on the economic geography within a country, when regions within the country have
different access to the world market.
The first paper introduces internal geography into the Melitz (2003) model to ex-
amine how external and internal liberalizations affect the economic geography within
a country. By dividing a country into a coastal region and an inland region, the
model shows that trade leads the coastal region to have more than proportional share
of industry, and causes firms in the coastal region to be larger and more productive
than firms in the inland region. Both external and internal liberalizations encourage
industry agglomeration in the coastal region. However, external trade liberalization
leads to firm divergence, and internal liberalization leads to firm convergence, be-
tween coastal and inland regions. This allows me to test the relative importance of
internal and external liberalization. Using Chinese data from 1998 to 2007, I find
that the manufacturing sector grew faster in the coastal region than in the inland
region after the WTO accession in 2001. Firms also converged between coastal and
inland regions, indicating that internal liberalization had stronger effects during this
period.
In the second paper, I document large economic discontinuities across the east/non-
east provincial borders in China and argue that the border effects are largely due to
preferential policies that give the east advantages in international trade and economic
development. Using counties contiguous to the borders of 4 plain provinces, I find
that manufacturing activities (output, employment, and export) increase abruptly
from the west to the east of the borders. The counties in the east also have a lower
share of agricultural population and a higher share of output by foreign firms. The
economic discontinuities are larger for non-state sectors than for the state sector, and
are stronger in non-mountain regions than in mountain regions. The large economic
discontinuities are unlikely to be explained by geographic and cultural differences
across the borders, and can be accounted for by the policy differences between east
and non-east provinces. I find that the openness level and the index of market liber-
alization can account for a large part of the east/non-east divide.
In the third paper, I use the ending of the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA) to study
the effects of an external trade liberalization on Chinese textile and clothing industry.
After the Multi-fiber Arrangement ended in 2005, Chinese textile and clothing exports
in products that faced quotas before experienced significant boom. The effects are
stronger in the coastal region than in the inland region. Using distance to the seaport
as a measure of world-market access, I show that the external trade liberalization (the
quota removal) had larger effects on regions with better access to the world market.
A further analysis of firm entry shows that the large adjustment of export after the
expiration of the MFA was largely due to destination and product expansions by
existing firms.
KEYWORDS: external integration; internal liberalization; coastal agglomeration;
the border effect; the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA)
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Economic activity, in its nature, is spatial. The economic theory emphasizes the
importance of proximity to larger markets in shaping the economic geography in
the world (Krugman (1991)). In a time of globalization, it is evident that economic
activities are concentrated in coastal regions. Now, 44% of the world population lives
within 150 kilometers of the sea. In the US, 51% of the population lives within 80
km of the sea or the Great Lakes. These regions account for only 13% of the US land
area, but they account for 57% of GDP in 2000 (Rappaport and Sachs (2003)). In
China, 44% of the population lives in coastal provinces. Those provinces account for
13.3% of the land area in mainland China, but they account for 58.6% of GDP in
2004. Many other countries show a similar pattern. Perhaps a more visual way to see
this is to look at night light from outer space. As we can see from Figure 1.1, most
points that glitter at night are in the coastal regions.
Figure 1.1: The World Map of Night Light in 2010
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) earth observation group.
Accompanying the “coastal economy” is a surge of international trade. According
to the World Trade Organization (WTO), world trade volume has increased 27 fold
from $296 billion in 1950 to $8 trillion in 2005. Since the 1950s, international trade
has grown twice as fast as world GDP. Maritime transport plays an important role
in international trade. The international shipping industry is responsible for 90% of
world trade.
With both the agglomeration of economic activities in the coastal regions and
the connections between countries by international trade, it is natural to ask, can
globalization help explain the agglomeration of economic activities in the coastal
regions? A more formal question is: Can international trade shape the economic
geography of a country?
To explore the question, we need to look at the internal geography within a coun-
try. If all regions within a country are equal and they have equal access to the world
market, then international trade would have the same effects on all regions. However,
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intra-national trade costs are still sizable in many countries, especially in developing
countries. For example, Atkin and Donaldson (2015) find that intra-national trade
costs in Ethiopia and Nigeria are 7-15 times larger than that in the US. The global
map of accessibility (Figure 1.2) also shows that different regions have quite different
access to larger markets.
Figure 1.2: A Global Map of Accessibility
Source: European Commission. The map shows travel time
to major cities. Darker color means longer travel time.
When different regions have different access to the world market and domestic
trade costs are substantial, international trade will have heterogeneous effects on
different regions. Regions with better access to the world market face more compe-
tition, but also have better opportunities to export. Regions less connected to the
world market find them more difficult to engage in international trade, but are also
protected from international competition. The interaction between domestic trade
costs and international trade could cause firms in different regions to have different
productivities and also lead to the agglomeration of economic activities in coastal
regions.
My first paper builds up a theoretical model to formalize this idea. To model
that different regions have different access to the world market, I assume a country
is divided into a coastal region and an inland region, and the inland region has to
trade through the coastal region with the rest of the world. Firms in the inland re-
gion have to pay extra domestic trade costs to export and import. Thus, when the
country opens to trade, firms would want to locate near the larger market (the world
market) to save trade costs. Since domestic trade costs are sizable, firms would prefer
to produce in the coastal region to reduce trade costs. This hub effect (Krugman
(1993)) could generate industrial agglomeration in the coastal region. I also assume
that firms have different productivities and have to pay for a sunk cost when entering
a new market, as in Melitz (2003). Since firms are heterogeneous and entering a
foreign market is expensive, only the most productive firms choose to export. Less ef-
ficient firms only serve the domestic market, because the profit (for these firms) from
exporting is less than the cost of entering foreign markets. The least productive firms
exit the market due to foreign competition. This selection mechanism could increase
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the average industry productivity and lead the exporters to be more productive than
non-exporters. When domestic trade costs are high, the coastal region faces more
foreign competition, and the selection effect is stronger. By combining the selection
mechanism with the hub effect, my model generates the following predictions: 1. the
coastal region has a higher average productivity than the inland region; 2. the coastal
region has more than a proportional share of manufacturing firms. 3. Both internal
and external liberalizations lead to coastal agglomeration. However, internal liberal-
izations lead to firm convergence, and external liberalizations lead to firm divergence,
between the coastal and the inland region.
The model implications are tested by using Chinese manufacturing data. I choose
China because it has high domestic trade costs and different regions in China have
different access to the world market. The eastern part of China faces the Pacific
Ocean and is close to the world market. The western part is surrounded by moun-
tains and deserts, and it is difficult to trade with other countries directly. I use the
manufacturing data from 1999 to 2007 to look at the economic geography in China.
I also study how China’s WTO accession affected the industry distribution, firm pro-
ductivity, and regional inequalities in the coastal and inland regions. The data shows
that there are more manufacturing activities in the coastal regions, and firms in the
coastal region are more productive, which are consistent with the model implications.
A further regression analysis shows that after the WTO accession, firm agglomerated
in the coastal region. The difference in firm size and firm productivity (measured
by valued added per labor) also narrowed between the coastal and the inland region,
indicating that internal liberalizations are more significant during the study period.
Since it is the internal geography that caused the heterogeneous effects of trade
liberalizations, I further explore what determines the market access of a region. Geog-
raphy plays a role, but policies could also cause regions to have different world-market
access. In the second paper, I look at the policy differences between the eastern
and non-eastern provinces of China, and argue that the policy differences between
provinces can account for the large economic discontinuities across the east/non-east
of China.
In the paper, I first document that there are large economic discontinuities across
the east/non-east provincial borders. Using counties contiguous to the borders of
4 plain provinces, I find that manufacturing activities (output, employment, and
export) increase abruptly from the west to the east of the borders. The counties
in the east also have a lower share of agricultural population and a higher share
of output by foreign firms. The economic discontinuities are larger for non-state
sectors than for the state sector, and are stronger in non-mountain regions than in
mountain regions. Since the border counties in the east and in the west are similar
in geographic conditions and culture, the large economic discontinuities across the
border are unlikely to be explained by geography and culture. Meanwhile, China is an
economically decentralized country and different provinces have different development
strategies. Since the reform and opening-up of China, the eastern provinces have been
given preferential policies in international trade and economic development. Thus,
there are policy differences between provinces and the effects are most evident at
the borders. I find that differences in the openness level and the index of market
3
liberalization between provinces can account for a large part of the east/non-east
divide.
In the third paper, I examine how the removal of the Multi-fiber Arrangement
(MFA) affected the textile and clothing industries in China. The MFA was a quota
system that restricted the textile and clothing exports from developing countries to
developed countries. It ended on January 1, 2005. China is an important player in
the world textile and clothing market, and its exports to developed countries were
highly constrained by the MFA. Thus, the expiration of MFA provides an opportunity
to study the effects of trade liberalization on the distribution of textile and clothing
exports. After the Multi-fiber Arrangement ended in 2005, Chinese textile and cloth-
ing exports in products that faced quotas before experienced significant boom. The
effects are stronger in the coastal region than in the inland region. Using distance
to the seaport as a measure of world-market access, I show that the external trade
liberalization (the quota removal) had larger effects on regions with better access to
the world market. A further analysis of firm entry shows that the large adjustment
of export after the expiration of the MFA was largely due to due to destination and
product expansions by existing firms.
4
Chapter 2 External Integration, Internal Liberalization, and Coastal
Agglomeration
2.1 Introduction
Trade costs are central in determining the location of firms in economic geography
literature (Krugman (1980), Krugman (1991), Baldwin et al. (2003)). For large coun-
tries with internal geography, trade costs can be divided into external trade costs
and internal trade costs. External trade costs include international transportation
cost and international trade barriers imposed by both domestic and foreign countries.
Internal trade costs include internal trade barriers caused by physical geography, as
well as market segregation and other man-made trade barriers. The interactions of
external and internal trade costs determine the location of firms within a country.
Recent research studying the effects of economic integration on economic geogra-
phy within a country have been focusing on external trade liberalizations (Coşar and
Fajgelbaum (2016), Fajgelbaum and Redding (2014)), although internal trade costs
are sizable (Atkin and Donaldson (2015)) in many counties and internal trade cost
reductions are equally significant. Indeed, for many developing countries, external
integration is often accompanied by internal liberalization. Effects of internal liber-
alization and external integration are often intertwined and are hard to distinguish.
Thus, there is a need to study external and internal liberalization simultaneously and
to distinguish their effects on the economic geography within a country.
In this paper, I introduce internal geography into the Melitz (2003) model to study
the effects of external and internal trade liberalization on the economic geography
within a country. By dividing a country into two regions (the coastal region and
the inland region) with different access to the world market, the model generates
rich implications on firm productivity and location. When a country participates
in international trade, firms in the coastal region are on average more productive
than firms in the inland region, as competitions from abroad push up the surviving
productivity threshold in the coastal region more than that in the inland region.
However, exporting firms in the inland region are on average more productive than
those in the coastal region, as firms in the inland region need to be more productive to
overcome the higher trade costs of exporting aboard. Thus, the exporting productivity
threshold is higher in the inland region. Average firm size and profit are both higher in
the coastal region. Exposure to international trade gives the coastal region a location
advantage, and leads the coastal region to have more than proportional share of
industry (the increasing returns to scale sector). The inland region, on the other
hand, sees a decline in its industry sector. If internal migration is restricted, real
wage will also be higher in the coastal region.
The effects of external and internal trade liberalizations are also discussed. Ex-
ternal trade liberalization magnifies the location advantage of the coastal region and
leads firms in the industry sector to agglomerate in the coastal region. This relocation
of firms tends to decrease the real wage in the inland region and enlarge the real wage
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gap between coastal and inland regions. External trade liberalization also increases
the difference between firms in the coastal and inland regions. On the other hand, in-
ternal trade liberalization decreases the location advantage of the coastal region. The
difference between firms in the coastal and inland region also decreases when internal
trade costs are reduced. But as the coastal region is always better connected to the
world market than the inland region, reducing internal trade costs still encourages
agglomeration in the coastal region. A decrease of internal trade costs increases the
real wage in both regions, but also increases the real wage gap before all firms have
agglomerated in the coastal region. After that, a further internal trade liberalization
reduces the real wage gap between the coastal and the inland region.
The model is then brought to the data by using Chinese prefecture level data dur-
ing a period of both internal and external liberalizations. I test the main implications
of the model: both internal and external trade liberalizations lead to agglomeration of
firms in the coastal region; external trade liberalization leads to firm divergence and
internal liberalization leads to firm convergence between coastal and inland regions. I
find that after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), a prefecture 250
km closer to the seaport experienced a 5.47% increase in manufacturing output com-
pared with a prefecture with average distance (396 km) to the seaport. Manufacturing
employment increased by 16.1%; number of firms increased by 14.4%; Manufacturing
export increased by 7.27%. I also find that after China’s WTO accession, average
firm size (firm revenue) increased 11.5% more in the inland region than in the coastal
region. Exporting probability in the inland region increased more by 0.5 percentage.
Firm productivity also grew faster in the inland region. Value added per labor in-
creased 9.27% more and annual wage increased 5.1% more in the inland region after
the WTO accession.
The results are consistent with the model implication that economic integration
(both internal and external) leads to industry agglomeration in the coastal region.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that external trade liberalization leads to ag-
glomeration in the coastal region, the results suggest that internal trade liberalization
is the primary force behind the coastal agglomeration during the study period, as we
see firm convergence between the coastal and the inland region. Indeed, compared
with tariff and non-tariff reduction, domestic reforms and market liberalizations that
significantly reduced the disadvantages of inland regions in international trade are
more important during the study period.
Since Krugman (1991), the new economic geography (NEG) literature has been fo-
cusing on the home market effect (HME) to explain economic agglomeration. Larger
markets tend to have more than proportional share of industry. In this model, the
agglomeration force is similar to the home market effect extensively discussed in the
previous literature (Baldwin et al. (2003)), but it emphasizes the importance of be-
ing close to the larger market, not just being the larger market. The agglomeration
mechanism is the hub effect discussed by Krugman (1993). In this paper, it is the
location (how easy it is to access the international market) that determines the eco-
nomic geography within a country, not just how large the coastal and the inland
region is.
The model brings firm heterogeneity to the NEG model. Adding firm hetero-
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geneity does not change the results about industry agglomeration, but it enriches the
model implications about firm productivity and exporting behavior. The model could
be used to explain why the coastal region is more productive, and has a higher share
of firms participating in international trade. The different implications of internal
and external trade liberalizations on firm convergence also give us a way to determine
which liberalization dominates when both internal and external trade liberalizations
happen during the same period.
The model is related to the literature studying the economic geography under
heterogeneous firm framework. Baldwin and Okubo (2006) add firm heterogeneity
into a footloose capital (FC) model to study the location of firms when two regions are
not symmetric. By assuming a relocation cost, they show that the most productive
firms move to the larger region first, causing the larger region to be more productive.
While my model in the closed economy case is very similar to their model, I do not
have this sorting effect in my model. In this model, firm dies in the inland region and
grows in the coastal region, there is no relocation of firms. It should be noted that in
their model, firm productivity difference between the two regions relies on the ad hoc
assumption of firm relocation cost; in this model, the productivity difference between
the coastal and the inland region originates from the different levels of exposure to
the world market.
The paper is also related to a growing literature studying the effects of external
integration on internal economic geography. Coşar and Fajgelbaum (2016) build up
a Ricardian type model to show that external trade liberalization in China leads
labor intensive and export oriented industries to agglomerate in the coastal region.
Fajgelbaum and Redding (2014) use Argentina’s entry into the world market to show
that locations with better access to the world market have a higher economic density.
While both their papers and mine predict agglomeration in the coastal region, the
mechanism is different. Their papers focus on comparative advantages and inter-
industry relocation while my paper concentrates on increasing returns to scale and
intra-industry relocation.
The model distinguishes between internal and external trade liberalization and
shows they have different implications on firm convergence between coastal and in-
land regions. Previous literature studying the effect of trade liberalization has focused
on external trade liberalizations, especially tariff and non-tariff reductions. But for
many developing countries, external trade liberalization is often accompanied by in-
ternal liberalizations. Tang and Wei (2009) document that joining the WTO usually
comes with the commitment of domestic market liberalizations for developing coun-
tries. Effects of external and internal trade liberalizations are often intertwined.
Meanwhile, internal liberalization is hard to measure and data on internal trade costs
are difficult to obtain. Thus, measuring and comparing the effects of internal and
external trade liberalizations is an empirical challenge. Because my model makes
different predictions about the effects of internal and external trade liberalization, I
am able to test their relative importance without measuring their magnitudes. The
empirical results suggest that internal trade liberalization is the primary driver be-
hind the coastal agglomeration during the study period. This also supports the idea
that for many developing countries, the gains from trade liberalizations go beyond
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the usual external trade costs reduction. The effects of internal reform and market
liberalization appear to be at least as important1.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 specifies the model and solve the closed
and open equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the effects of external and internal trade
liberalizations. Sector 4 tests the model implications using Chinese data during a
period of trade liberalizations. Section 5 concludes. A more comprehensive discussion
about labor allocation in the open economy is delegated to the appendix.
2.2 Model
The model introduces firm heterogeneity and internal geography into a new eco-
nomic geography model. It emphasizes the importance of being close to the world
market in shaping the economic geography within a country. Specifically, I assume
that the coastal region is equal in size to the inland region, so the traditional home
market effect does not function. The agglomeration force in the model thus comes
solely from the location advantage of the coastal region, or “the hub effect”. I also
introduce the “selection” mechanism of the Melitz (2003) model to show that as the
coastal region face more competitions from abroad, the selection effect is stronger and
firms in the coastal region are larger and more productive.
The way I introduce internal geography is to let the inland region trade through
the coastal region with foreign countries. The aim is to let the coastal region have
location advantages in international trade compared with the inland region. The
assumption also guarantees that the coastal region always has a location advantage
as long as internal geography exists.
2.2.1 Model Structure
The model is comprised of n+ 1 symmetric countries, i.e. a home country and n
foreign countries. There is only one production factor, labor (L). Each country has
two sectors, a homogeneous sector (A) and a differentiated sector (M).2
Each country is divided into two regions; a coastal region with population LC and
an inland region with population LI . I assume that LI = LC , so that the coastal
region will be identical with the inland region in autarky.
Trade of the homogeneous good is free. Trade of differentiated products incurs
iceberg trade costs. The coastal region can trade with the rest of the world directly
with a trade cost τx, but the inland region has to trade with foreign countries through
the coastal region. The domestic trade cost between two regions also take the iceberg
form, and is set to be τ .
1For example, Khandelwal et al. (2013) find that the ending of Multi-fiber Agreement also re-
moved the inefficient quota allocation system and led to a higher welfare gain from trade liberaliza-
tion.
2In the economic geography literature, the agriculture sector is often consider as the homogeneous
sector, and the industry sector is often considered as the differentiated sector. I use the same
assumption in this paper.
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The labor market is segregated across regions. Migration is not allowed across
regions/countries, but labor is free to move between A and M sector in each region.
There is no moving cost between A sector and M sector.
Preference
The preference is a two-tier demand system. The upper tier is a C-D utility
function and the lower tier is of Dixit-Stiglitz (CES) preference,
U = A1−β
[∫
j∈M
c(j)ρ dj
]β/ρ
The demand for and revenue of a firm from region j in region i are:
qij =
Ri
Pi
(pij
Pi
)−σ
rij = Ri(
pij
Pi
)1−σ
where i ∈ {C, I, f} is the region and j is the variety of differentiated products. Ri
is total expenditure of region i on differentiated products, and is equal to βLi. The
price level Pi is defined as:
Pi =
[∫
j∈Mi
p1−σij dj
]1/(1−σ)
Production
Production of the homogeneous good (A) uses constant returns to scale technology.
Without losing generality, I assume that one unit of labor produces one unit of A
product. Since trade of the homogeneous good is free, prices of the homogeneous
good are equalized among different countries/regions. If the homogeneous product
is produced in both regions, wages are also equalized. In this model, I assume the
homogeneous good is always produced in both regions. I normalize the wage to be
one.
Production of differentiated products (M) uses increasing returns to scale tech-
nology. Firms are heterogeneous and each has a productivity ϕ drawn from the
distribution G(ϕ). The production function is:
l(q|ϕ) = f + q/ϕ
Since the elasticity of demand is constant, the price mark-up is also constant, so
p(ϕ) = 1
ρϕ
= σ
σ − 1
1
ϕ
Thus, firm profit is:
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π(ϕ) = r(ϕ)
σ
− f = R
σ
(Pρϕ)σ−1 − f
Firm entry and exit behaviors are assumed to be the same as in Melitz (2003).
Firms pay a sunk cost fe to draw a productivity from G(ϕ). There is a fixed cost of
production, so firms only produce when their productivities are above some threshold
ϕ∗.
The average productivity of all firms in the market (or the productivity of a
representative firm) is defined as:
ϕ̃(ϕ∗) =
[
1
1−G(ϕ∗)
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
]1/(σ−1)
The price level, aggregate revenue, aggregate production, and aggregate profits of
differentiated products are as follows:
P =
[∫ ∞
0
p(ϕ)1−σMu(ϕ)dϕ
]1/(1−σ)
= M1/(1−σ)p(ϕ̃)
R =
∫ ∞
0
r(ϕ)Mu(ϕ)dϕ = Mr(ϕ̃)
Q = R
P
= M1/ρq(ϕ̃)
Π =
∫ ∞
0
π(ϕ)Mu(ϕ)dϕ = Mπ(ϕ̃)
2.2.2 Closed Economy Equilibrium
When there is no international trade, the two regions can only trade with each
other. Since trade between the two regions does not incur fixed cost, all products
produced in one region will also be traded to the other region. There is no sorting
effect of trading with the other region.
The free entry (FE) conditions requires that
π̄i =
δfe
1−G(ϕ∗i )
(2.1)
The average profit of a firm in region i is:
π̄i =
1
σ
(ri(ϕ̃) + τ 1−σrj(ϕ̃))− f (2.2)
where ri(ϕ̃) = Ri(Piρϕ̃)σ−1. Since the productivity threshold satisfies:
1
σ
(ri(ϕ∗) + τ 1−σrj(ϕ∗))− f = 0
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The average profit (the zero cutoff profit (ZCP) condition) is:
π̄i = ([
ϕ̃∗i
ϕ∗i
]σ−1 − 1)f = k(ϕ∗i )f (2.3)
Combining (1) and (3) solves cutoff threshold and average profit in each region.
It is easy to show that both regions have the same average productivity and profit.
Since the two regions are equal in size, the number of firms is also equal between the
coastal and the inland regions. In the closed equilibrium, the coastal region and the
inland region are identical.
2.2.3 Opening Up to International Trade
The Equilibrium
When opening up to international trade, firms can sell in both home country and
abroad (with some probability). Since there is no fixed cost of trading between the
coastal region (C) and the inland region (I), foreign firms trade with the inland region
through the coastal region withour paying additional fixed exporting cost. Thus, in
the open equilibrium, the inland and the coastal region have the same varieties of
products. It is only the price of each product, and thus price level, will be different.
The average profits of firms in region C and region I are:
π̄C =
Rt
σ
(PCtρϕ̃C)σ−1 + npCx
Rf
σ
(Pfρϕ̃Cx)σ−1τ 1−σx − f − npCxfx (2.4)
π̄I =
Rt
σ
(PItρϕ̃I)σ−1 + npIx
Rf
σ
(Pfρϕ̃Ix)σ−1(τxτ)1−σ − f − npIxfx (2.5)
where pix = 1−G(ϕ
∗
ix)
1−G(ϕ∗i )
is the probability that firms in region i ∈ {C, I} export to foreign
markets. RtPit is the index of market demand accounting for transportation costs for
a firm in region i (Melitz and Redding (2012)), and
Rt = RC +RI
P σ−1Ct =
RC
Rt
P σ−1C +
RI
Rt
P σ−1I τ
1−σ
P σ−1It =
RC
Rt
P σ−1C τ
1−σ + RI
Rt
P σ−1I
Since all countries are symmetric, Rf = Rt and Pf = PCt. In equilibrium, the
cutoff thresholds in coastal and inland regions must satisfy:
Rt
σ
(PCtρϕ∗C)σ−1 = f (2.6)
Rt
σ
(PItρϕ∗I)σ−1 = f (2.7)
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And exporting thresholds in both regions satisfy:
Rf
σ
(Pfρϕ∗Cx)σ−1τ 1−σx = fx (2.8)
Rf
σ
(Pfρϕ∗Ix)σ−1(ττx)1−σ = fx (2.9)
The ZCP curve of the coastal and the inland region can be got by substituting
equation (2.6)-(2.9) into (2.4) and (2.5):
π̄C = fk(ϕ∗C) + npCxfxk(ϕ∗Cx) (2.10)
π̄I = fk(ϕ∗I) + npIxfxk(ϕ∗Ix) (2.11)
where k(ϕ) = ( ϕ̃
ϕ
)σ−1 − 1 is a non-increasing function of ϕ under some extreme value
distributions.3 The cutoff threshold and exporting threshold, as well as average profit,
can be solved by combining the ZCP and FE curve with equation (2.6)-(2.9).
Proposition 1. In the open equilibrium, the coastal region has a higher cutoff thresh-
old, but a lower exporting threshold, compared with the inland region. The coastal re-
gion has a higher percentage of firms participating in international trade. ϕ∗I < ϕ∗C <
ϕ∗Cx < ϕ
∗
Ix; pCx > pIx.
Proof. Compare the two cutoff equations (2.6) (2.7) with the two exporting threshold
equations (2.8) (2.9),
ϕ∗Cx
ϕ∗C
= (fx
f
)
1
σ−1
PCt
Pf
τx (2.12)
ϕ∗Ix
ϕ∗I
= (fx
f
)
1
σ−1
PIt
Pf
ττx (2.13)
Since P σ−1It τσ−1 − PCt = RCRt P
σ−1
C + RIRtP
σ−1
I τ
σ−1 − (RC
Rt
P σ−1C + RIRtP
σ−1
I τ
1−σ) =
RI
Rt
P σ−1I (τσ−1 − τ 1−σ) > 0 for τ > 1, then PCt < PItτ and
ϕ∗Cx
ϕ∗C
<
ϕ∗Ix
ϕ∗I
. Because k(ϕ)
decreases with ϕ, the ZCP curve of the inland region lies below the ZCP curve of the
coastal region. Thus, ϕ∗C > ϕ∗I .
The relationship between ϕIx and ϕCx is derived by comparing equation (2.8) and
(2.9):
ϕ∗Ix = τϕ∗Cx (2.14)
Thus, ϕ∗I < ϕ∗C < ϕ∗Cx < ϕ∗Ix, and pCx > pIx.
After opening up to international trade, the coastal region has a higher cutoff
threshold, but a lower exporting threshold compared with the inland region. The two
3For Pareto distribution with shape parameter θ, it can be shown that k(ϕ) = σ−1θ−σ+1 .
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regions are no longer symmetric even if they have the same endowment of labor. In
the open equilibrium, firms in the coastal region are more exposed to international
trade. On the one hand, easier access to the world market increases the profit from
exporting abroad (if they were to export), so the exporting threshold in the coastal
region is lower; on the other hand, firms in the coastal region face more competition
from abroad, so the cutoff threshold in the coastal region is higher. Overall, firms in
the coastal regions are on average larger and more profitable than those in the inland
region.
Proposition 2. In the open equilibrium, firms in the coastal region are on average
more profitable and larger than firms in the inland region. π̄C > π̄I , r̄C > r̄I .
Proof. The free entry condition implies π̄i = δfe1−G(ϕ∗i ) ; average profit is positively
correlated with the cutoff threshold. Since the cutoff threshold in the coastal region
is higher, so is the average firm profit.
From the ZCP curve, the average revenue of a firm in region i is
r̄i = σ(π̄i + f + npixfx) (2.15)
Since π̄C > π̄I and pCx > pIx, it follows immediately that the average firm revenue
in the coastal region is higher than that in the inland region.
In the open equilibrium, the coastal region trades more with the rest of the world.
Since all countries are symmetric, trade of M products has to be balanced for each
country. The coastal region will be the net exporter and the inland region will be
the net importer of M goods. In the model, total expenditure on the differentiated
products are fixed to be βLt, so total labor allocated to the M sector is also fixed.
Since migration is not allowed, the better exporting opportunity in the coastal region
will draw labor from A sector to M sector. In the inland region, labor migrates from
M sector to A sector.
Exposure to international trade, as well as “relocation” of firms in the M sector4,
affects the price level and the average productivity in both regions. Since the inland
region has to import through the coastal region, the prices of foreign products are
always higher in the inland region. Moreover, the relocation of firms to the coastal
region means that the inland region has to import more from the coastal region. This
also drives up the price level. Overall, the price level in the inland region will be
higher than that in the coastal region.
Proposition 3. Opening up to international trade leads the coastal region to have
more than proportional share of industry. In the open equilibrium, the coastal region
has a higher average productivity and a lower price level compared with the inland
region. ϕ̃Ct > ϕ̃It; PC < PI .
4Firms cannot move between regions in this model. The relocation of firms is through the growth
in the number of firms in one region and the death of firms in the other region.
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Proof. Since ϕ∗C > ϕ∗I , the cutoff threshold conditions (6) and (7) imply PCt < PIt.
Using the definition of PCt and PIt, we get:
RC
Rt
P σ−1C +
RI
Rt
P σ−1I τ
1−σ <
RC
Rt
P σ−1C τ
1−σ + RI
Rt
P σ−1I
It simplifies to:
P σ−1C <
RI
RC
P σ−1I
Since the coastal region and the inland region are equal in market size (RC = RI),
it follows immediately that PC < PI .
Average market productivity in a region is defined as the average productivity of
firms selling in that market, weighted by its share of revenue in this region:
ϕ̃σ−1Ct =
1
Mt
[MCϕ̃σ−1C +MI(
ϕ̃I
τ
)σ−1 + nτ 1−σx (MCpCxϕ̃σ−1Cx +MIpIxϕ̃σ−1Ix τ 1−σ)]
ϕ̃σ−1It =
1
Mt
[MC(
ϕ̃C
τ
)σ−1 +MIϕ̃σ−1I + n(τxτ)1−σ(MCpCxϕ̃σ−1Cx +MIpIxϕ̃σ−1Ix τ 1−σ)]
whereMt = MC +MI +n(MCpCx+MIpIx) is the total number ofM products in each
region. Note that firms selling in the coastal region also sells in the inland region,
and vice versa.
The price levels of M products in the coastal and the inland region are defined
as:
P 1−σC =MC(ρϕ̃C)σ−1 +MI(ρϕ̃I)σ−1τ 1−σ + nτ 1−σx (MCpCx(ρϕ̃Cx)σ−1+
MIpIx(ρϕ̃Ix)σ−1τ 1−σ)
(2.16)
P 1−σI =MC(ρϕ̃C)σ−1τ 1−σ +MI(ρϕ̃I)σ−1 + n(τxτ)1−σ(MCpCx(ρϕ̃Cx)σ−1+
MIpIx(ρϕ̃Ix)σ−1τ 1−σ)
(2.17)
Using the definition of ϕ̃Ct and ϕ̃It, the price level of M products in both regions
can be rewritten as:
PC = (Mt)
1
1−σ
1
ρϕ̃Ct
(2.18)
PI = (Mt)
1
1−σ
1
ρϕ̃It
(2.19)
PC < PI implies ϕ̃Ct > ϕ̃It. The average market productivity in the coastal region
is higher than that in the inland region.
When opening up to international trade, firms face competitions from abroad.
This competition effect drives out the least productive firms. Meanwhile, the mar-
ket access effect from international trade increase the revenue of the most productive
firms. Overall, opening up to international trade increases the average market produc-
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tivity. In this model, since the coastal region is more exposed to foreign competitions,
the average productivity is also higher in the coastal region.
The opening up breaks up the symmetry between the coastal and the inland
region. Firms in the coastal region have better opportunities to export and are more
productive. To produce more and export more, they have to pay a higher real wage
to pull labor from the A sector (constant returns to scale sector) to the M sector
(the increasing returns to scale sector). To balance the trade, labor moves from the
M sector to the A sector in the inland region. Thus, the M sector agglomerates in
the coastal region. To get the labor allocation in each sector , as well as the number
of firms, in each region, we need to fully solve the model. This part is delegated
into the appendix. Numerical results show that opening up leads the M sector to
agglomerate into the coastal region, even if the coastal regional and the inland region
are symmetric in closed economy.
2.2.4 Welfare Analysis
The price level and the real wage in region i are defined as:
Λi = P 1−βA P
β
i = P
β
i
ωi =
wi
Λ = wiP
−β
i
Thus, real wage is inversely related with the price level of the differentiated prod-
ucts. When free trade in A sector equalizes the nominal wage in both regions, real
wage is inversely related to the price level of differentiated products. Solving PC and
PI using the cutoff threshold conditions (2.7) and (2.8), I get:
P σ−1C =
σf
(1− φ2)RCρσ−1
(ϕ∗C
1−σ − φϕ∗I
1−σ) (2.20)
P σ−1I =
σf
(1− φ2)RIρσ−1
(ϕ∗I
1−σ − φϕ∗C
1−σ) (2.21)
Now the cutoff threshold of region i is not a sufficient statistic of welfare in region
i as in the Melitz model (Melitz and Redding (2012)). The welfare of region i depends
not only on the cutoff threshold of region i, but also on the cutoff threshold of the other
region. In the appendix, I prove that the price level of the coastal region decreases
with the cutoff threshold, and the price level of the inland region increases with the
cutoff threshold. Since the cutoff threshold in both regions increases after opening
up to international trade, real wage increases in the coastal region and decreases in
the inland region . In this model, trade actually hurts the inland region5.
Opening up to international trade increases the average productivity in both re-
5Regions with “location disadvantages” could lose from trade. For example, Faber (2014) studies
the effects of the construction of China’s National Trunk Highway System (NTHS) and finds that
counties connected to NTHS grew slower than those not connected.
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gions. Meanwhile, both regions may have more varieties of M products6. These
are the channels discussed in heterogeneous firm literature through which trade can
benefit. However, there is also industry relocation to the coastal region after trade.
The “relocation effect” increases the share of product imported and incurs more trade
costs for the inland region. It tends to increase the price level in the inland region.
In this model, the effect of industry relocation overweighs the effect of productivity
and variety change in the inland region. Thus, the inland region see an increase of
price level and a decrease of real wage.
Proposition 4. In the open equilibrium, the real wage in the coastal region is higher
than the real wage in the inland region. ωC > ωI .
2.3 External and Internal Trade Liberalization
In this section, I consider how external trade liberalizations (decrease of τx, fx)
and the internal trade liberalization (decrease of τ) affect firm size, productivity, firm
location and regional inequality. While both external and internal trade liberaliza-
tions lead to agglomeration in the coastal region, they have different implications on
regional inequality, as well as firm inequalities. External trade liberalization increases
regional real wage gap and difference in firms between the coastal and the inland re-
gion. Internal trade liberalization, on the other hand, first increases and eventually
decreases the regional inequality. It also decreases the difference in firms between the
coastal and the inland region.
The effects of decreasing international trade cost τx, fixed export cost fx and
domestic trade cost τ are discussed. Simulation results are shown in Figure 2.1-
Figure 2.6. Formal proofs of the effects of trade liberalizations are delegated into the
appendix.
2.3.1 Decreasing the International Trade Cost τx
When international trade cost τx decreases, both regions have better access to the
world market. Meanwhile, both regions face more competitions from abroad. Thus,
the cutoff threshold increases and the exporting threshold decreases in both regions.
Since a decrease of international trade cost have a larger “selection effect” on the
coastal region, the relative cutoff threshold ϕ
∗
C
ϕI∗
increases. Relative firm productivity
ϕ̃∗C
ϕ̃I∗
and relative firm size r̄C
r̄I
also increases. The reduction of international trade
cost also increases the relative exporting probability pCx
pIx
. To summarize, difference
in firms between the coastal and the inland region enlarges when international trade
cost τx is reduced.
The decrease of international trade cost also magnifies the location advantage of
the coastal region, thus causing firms to agglomerate in the coastal region. The pro-
6The number of variety consumed by each region does not necessarily increase. For example,
if firm productivity follows Pareto distribution and f = fx, the number of variety of goods in each
region does not change from trade liberalization.
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ductivity increase and the (possible) increase in the number of variety of M products
benefit both regions, but the industry relocation hurts the inland region and benefits
the coastal region. The coastal region experiences an increase of real wage but the
inland region suffers from real wage decrease. The regional inequality (in terms of
relative real wage) increases as international trade cost goes down. After all firms
in the M sector have agglomerated in the coastal region, a further decrease of in-
ternational trade cost will not affect firm location. Thus, the further reduction of
international trade cost will benefit both region equally, and the relative real wage
will stay constant.
Simulation results when international trade cost τx is reduced from nearly pro-
hibitive level (τx = 3) to free (τx = 1) are shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.1: The Effects of Decreasing τx on Firm Inequalities
2.3.2 Decreasing the Fixed Export Cost fx
Decreasing fixed export cost has similar effects with decreasing international trade
cost. It decrease the costs of exporting and introduces more competitions from abroad.
Thus, cutoff threshold increases and exporting threshold decreases in both regions.
Since the “selection effect” is stronger in the coastal region, a decrease of fixed export
cost will increase the difference in firms between the coastal and the inland region.
The decrease of fixed export cost encourages agglomeration of firms in the coastal
region. The relocation of firms benefits the coastal region but hurts the inland region.
After all firms in the M sector have agglomerated in the coastal region, a further
reduction of fixed exporting cost will benefit both region equally and the relative real
wage will stay constant.
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Figure 2.2: The Effects of Decreasing τx on Industry Agglomeration and Regional
Inequality
Assume fixed export cost is decreased from 3 to 0.16.7, the effects are shown in
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4.8
Effects of external trade liberalizations (decrease of τx, fx) can be summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 5. External trade liberalizations (decrease of τx or fx) encourage indus-
try agglomeration in the coastal region and increase the difference in firms between
coastal and inland regions. The coastal region benefits more from external trade liber-
alizations than the inland region. Regional inequality first increase, then stay constant
during the external trade liberalization.
2.3.3 Decreasing the Domestic Trade Cost τ
For simplicity, I consider the case when all countries decrease domestic trade costs
symmetrically. For the coastal region, substitute equation (2.12) into the ZCP curve
of the coastal region (2.10), it is easy to find that cutoff threshold does not change with
7To ensure that the exporting threshold is larger than the cutoff threshold, it must satisfy that
fx ≥ f( 1τx )
σ−1
8Here we do not see a complete specialization of production as fixed exporting cost decreases.
This is purely due to the choice of model parameters. If we choose τ = 1.2 and τx = 1.5, with all other
parameters stay the same, we will get the part where industry agglomerates in the coastal region.
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Figure 2.3: The Effects of Decreasing fx on Firm Inequalities
Figure 2.4: The Effects of Decreasing fx on Industry Agglomeration and Regional
Inequality
domestic trade cost. The exporting threshold also stays constant9. For the inland
9If the home country is a small country, and when only the home country decrease internal
trade cost, firms in the coastal region will not face more competition from abroad. Thus, exporting
threshold stays constant in the coastal region. Combine the FE condition with ZCP equation,
δfe = [1−G(ϕ∗C)]fk(ϕ∗C) + nfx[1−G(ϕ∗Cx)]k(ϕ∗Cx). It means that cutoff threshold ϕ∗C also do not
change. Therefore, when home country is a small country, unilateral internal trade liberalization
will not affect firm productivity in the coastal region.
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region, decreasing the domestic trade cost introduces more foreign competition. The
cutoff threshold increases, and the exporting threshold decreases as the domestic trade
cost decreases.
Decreasing the domestic trade cost creates a stronger “competitive effect” on the
inland region than the coastal region, thus decreasing relative firm productivity ϕ̃
∗
C
ϕ̃I∗
and relative firm size r̄C
r̄I
. Relative exporting probability pCx
pIx
also decreases. In the
extreme case of zero domestic trade cost, there is no difference in firms between coastal
and inland regions.
Decreasing the domestic trade cost increases the real wage in both regions. It also
causes relocation of firms to the coastal region, and enlarges the real wage difference
between the coastal and the inland region. However, after all firms in the industry
sector have agglomerated in the coastal region, a further decrease of domestic trade
cost does not affect the real wage in the coastal region, but still increase the real wage
in the inland region. Thus, a large enough internal trade liberalization can reduce
regional inequality.
Simulation results when the domestic trade cost is reduced from prohibitive level
(τ = 3) to free (τ = 1) are shown in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.5: The Effects of Decreasing τ on Firm Inequalities
Proposition 6. Symmetric internal trade liberalizations (decrease of τ ) in all coun-
tries encourage agglomeration of firms in the coastal region, and decrease the differ-
ences in firms between the coastal and the inland region. Both regions benefit from
internal trade liberalizations. Internal trade liberalization will first increase, but even-
tually decrease regional inequality.
The implications of internal and external trade liberalizations are different. Both
external and internal trade liberalizations lead to industry agglomeration in the
coastal region. However, external trade liberalizations lead to firm divergence, and
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Figure 2.6: The Effects of Decreasing τ on Industry Agglomeration and Regional
Inequality
internal trade liberalizations lead to firm convergence between coastal and inland
regions.
2.4 Empirical Evidence From China
2.4.1 Background
Why China
China is an ideal country to test the model implications, as it can be clearly
divided into the coastal region and the inland region. The east part of the country
faces the Pacific Ocean and has easy access to the world market. China has 7 of the
10 largest ports in the world, and they are all in the east coast. The west part of
the country, however, is not so easily connected with the rest of the world. Natural
barriers (mountains and desserts) separate China from the rest of the Asia, making
it difficult to import and export through the west border. The internal geography of
China varies a lot from the east to the west. The east is mainly plains and the altitude
is low. The vast lands of the west are mountains and plateaus, and the altitude is
high. This makes transportation between the east and the west expensive. Thus, in
China, distance to the seaport (or distance to the coast) acts as a good measure of
access to the world market.
During the past 30 years, China experienced one of the largest liberalizations in
history. Before the reform, China was basically a closed country. Its share of trade in
GDP was only 8.5% in 1977. The opening up policy launched in 1978 and subsequent
reforms made China the largest trading nation in the world. In 2007, its share of
21
trade in GDP has increased to 62.3%.10 The “reform and opening up" transformed
China from a closed economy to the world’s largest trading nation. Thus, there is
sufficient variation to allow us to study the effects of trade liberalization.
From Partial Opening up to Comprehensive Opening Up
Trade liberalizations, like many other economic reforms of China, are incremental.
In 1978, China set up four special economic zones (SEZs) to began its opening up
plan11. The success of the SEZs led to the opening up of 14 coastal cities in 1984.
Hainan province was set up as a new special economic zone in 1988 and Pudong
New Area in Shanghai was established in 1990 and was given more favorable opening
up policies. Eventually, the opening up policy was extended to all coastal regions12.
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 marked
a new era with all regions actively involved in international trade.
In China, opening up and economic reform are intertwined. For a planned econ-
omy like China before reform, opening up means that it has to change the way that
the economy functions. To avoid reform failures, the earliest reforms were tested in
the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. The SEZs
were set up to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and to trade with other coun-
tries, but also to “learn” about the market economy. SEZs were given considerable
economic freedom to trade and conduct economic reforms. Foreign firms were given
preferential policies13 to set up factories in SEZs and the private sector was allowed
to grow in the SEZs. The establishment of SEZs allowed the central government to
experiment in the market economy without bearing the political risk of undermin-
ing the socialist economy. But a “side effect” is that it also gave SEZs the “one step
ahead” advantage (Vogel (1989)). The preferential policies in SEZs, and later in other
coastal regions, created the “opening up gradient” between the coastal and the inland
region, where the coastal regions had a high level of openness while the inland region
was still shut off from international trade.
Figure A.3 in the appendix shows an opening up map in 1998 based on preferential
policy index from Demurger et al. (2002). The coastal region has a higher level of
openness. All 5 special economic zones are in the coastal region. By 1998, there
were 32 national Economic and Technology Development Zones (ETDZ)14, of which
26 were in the coastal provinces. The inland provinces had only 6 ETDZs.
10The data are from World Development Indicators. Trade share is the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product
11The four SEZs are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen. They are in southeast China, and
are both geographically and culturally close to Hong Kong and Taiwan.
12China launched the “coastal development strategy” in 1988 to encourage coastal provinces to
fully participate in the international economy (Yang (1991)). A map of coastal and inland region in
China is shown in Appendix C.1.
13Preferential policies include (but are not limited to) tax and tariff reductions, lower rental cost
of land and factories, and access to the domestic market.
14National ETDZs are small regions (often within a prefecture) that enjoy many policies of the
SEZs.
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By late 1990s, China had decided to build a market economy. The partial opening
up policy had been proved successful and a more comprehensive opening up had
become consensus. Meanwhile, the preferential polices were believed to have caused
regional inequalities between the east and the west (Demurger et al. (2002), Démurger
et al. (2002)). The West Development Project was launched in 2000 to decrease
regional inequalities. Western provinces were given better policies to attract FDI and
develop industry. Large infrastructure projects aiming to decrease the geographic
disadvantages of the west were also launched.
To build a market economy, China finally decided to privatize the bulk of its
state owned sector, which was already losing profits and had become a burden of the
government. The privatization and restructuring of state owned firms went from 1998
to 2002. Fewsmith (2001) documents the political struggle before China joined the
WTO: the reformers (especially the then premier Rongji Zhu) wanted to use the WTO
accession as an external commitment to push forward economic reform. Bajona and
Chu (2003) argue that since state owned enterprises (SOE) reform is a prerequisite
of WTO accession, the welfare gain from SOE reform should also be counted as the
benefit of WTO accession15.
The WTO accession in December 2001 marked the final step of China’s compre-
hensive opening up. China promised to open up its domestic market and reduce its
trade barriers. By 2001, China’s tariff had been decreased to 13.4%, and was further
reduced to 4.9% by 200516. China also liberalized its trading regime and extended
the trading right to all firms. The reforms further liberalized China’s export potential
and it’s now world’s largest exporter and second largest importer.
The WTO accession should be seen as both external and internal trade liberal-
izations. The WTO accession decreased tariffs and non-tariff barriers (e.g. quota)
faced by Chinese exporting firms. This can be seen as external trade liberalizations
and is often seen as the main gains from trade. Meanwhile, the WTO accession re-
quired China to open its domestic market (not just the coastal region, but the whole
country) to foreign companies, thus decreased the policy advantages of the coastal
region. The WTO accession and subsequent economic reforms allow firms in the in-
land region to better participate in international trade. This amounts to an internal
trade liberalization in my model. Since China joined the WTO, the policy gradient
between the east and the west have been greatly reduced. Preferential policies were
extended to more cities in the inland region. By 2015, the number of national ETDZs
has increased to 219, of which about half (108) are in the inland provinces.
2.4.2 Empirical Strategy
In the following analysis, I test the main model implications that trade liberaliza-
tions leads to agglomeration of firms in the coastal region, and test whether internal
15SOE reforms also decreased local protectionism and facilitated domestic market integration.
16The tariff rate is the average tariff rate weighted by import value. Data are from United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The change of tariff rate between 1998 to 2007
are shown in Appendix figure A.4.
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or external liberalization is the primary force behind the coastal agglomeration. The
study period is from 1998 to 2007, a period when China experienced rapid liber-
alizations and joined the WTO in December 2001. I use prefectures in China as
observations. A prefecture is an administration unit above the county and below the
province. A prefecture usually has a central city and several surrounding counties.
It is large enough to form a local economy, but the geographic variation within the
prefecture is small, so we can treat it as a homogeneous region.
During the study period (1998-2007), there are both external and internal trade
liberalizations. The model predicts that they both lead to agglomeration of firms in
the coastal region. However, external trade liberalizations increase the difference in
firms between the coastal and the inland region; internal trade liberalizations decrease
the difference in firms between coastal and inland regions. To examine the effects of
trade liberalizations, I use the following basic specification:
yrt = αr + ηt + βln(Distancer)×WTOt + εrt (2.22)
where Distancer is the great-circle distance of a prefecture to the nearest seaport,
WTOt is a dummy variable that equal one after 2001. y is the outcome variables. I
include both prefecture and year fixed effect. While both coastal and inland regions
are affected by China’s WTO accession, the effects are different. The coefficient β
measure the heterogeneous effect of WTO accession on coastal and inland regions.
I divide my outcome variables into two groups. I use manufacturing output, man-
ufacturing employment, number of manufacturing firms and manufacturing exports
to see whether industry sector agglomerates in the coastal region. A negative and
significant β indicates that industry agglomerates in the coastal region after WTO
accession, as it means that prefectures closer to the seaport grew faster. I use average
firm revenue, exporting probability, value added per labor and annual wage to deter-
mine whether firms converge or diverge between coastal and inland regions after the
WTO accession. A positive and significant β shows firm convergence, since it means
that firms further away from the seaport grew faster after the WTO accession.
2.4.3 Data Description and China’s Economic Geography
I use the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms of China from 1998 to 2007. The
data set consists of all state owned firms and private firms with annual sales over
5 million yuan (about $600,000) and includes information about employment, pro-
duction, exports and other financial variables. The majority of firms included in the
survey are manufacturing firms, but the survey also contains some large mining and
utility firms. I only use the manufacturing firms in my analysis, because they are
tradable and their locations are affected by trade liberalizations. I aggregate the data
into prefecture level. In the sample, there are 338 prefectures, including four central
administrated cities.17
17The four central administrated cities are Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. They have
the same political rank as provinces, but have similar size with prefectures.
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I use distance from the center of a prefecture to the nearest seaport as a measure
of closeness to the world market. The average distance of a prefecture to the seaport
is 682 km. A map of access to the seaport is shown in the appendix C.1. To compare
the difference between the coastal region and the inland region, I define the coastal
region as all prefectures in coastal provinces. There are 115 prefectures in the coastal
region, and 223 prefectures in the inland region.
Table 2.1 gives the summary statistics of coastal and inland prefectures. It shows
the economic geography of China. The coastal region has a much higher economic
density. Manufacturing production and employment are much higher in coastal pre-
fectures. Exports are predominately concentrated in the coastal region. Coastal
prefectures export more and have a higher share of exporting firms. In coastal pre-
fectures, 26.3% of manufacturing output is exported, and 38.7% of firms participates
in export. In inland prefectures, only 5.7% of manufacturing output is exported, and
only 11.5% of firms exports. The economic structure is also different between the
coastal and inland regions. In inland prefectures, over 20% of manufacturing firms
is state owned. In coastal prefectures, only 8% of the manufacturing firms is state
owned. Foreign firms and private firms, on the other hand, account for a larger share
in coastal prefectures.
There are also considerable variations in firm size and productivity between the
coastal region and the inland region. Average firm revenue is higher in coastal pre-
fectures, but average exporter revenue is higher in inland prefectures. This suggests
that in general it is more difficult for a firm to survive in the coastal region, but it is
easier for it to export to the world market. On average, firms in the coastal region
are more productive than those in the inland region. Both annual wage and value
added per worker are higher in coastal prefectures than in inland prefectures.
Overall, Table 2.1 suggests what would happen in the model when a closed country
opens up: being closer to the larger world market leads to agglomeration of firms in the
coastal region and causes firms in the coastal region to be larger and more productive.
2.4.4 Regression Results
Before turning to the regression results, it is useful to look at the trends of outcome
variables during the study period (Figure 3.7). There are two things to notice. First,
the trends do not change abruptly in 2002 for either region, suggesting that WTO was
not a sudden shock to the economy. Second, we do see some changes of the trends
during this period. The top 4 figures show industry agglomeration in the coastal
region. For example, we see similar trends of employment between the coastal and
the inland region before 2000. After that, employment in the coastal region grew
much faster than the inland region. The number of firms in the coastal region also
grew faster than number of firms in the inland region, especially after 2003. The last
four figures show firm convergence between coastal and inland regions.
Table 2.2 shows the regression results. Panel A shows agglomeration of manufac-
turing activities in the coastal region after the WTO accession. Compared with a
prefecture with mean distance (396 km, such as Fuyang) to the seaport, a prefecture
one log distance closer to the seaport (146km, such as Yangzhou) experienced a 5.57%
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Table 2.1: The Coastal Region v.s. the Inland Region
Inland Prefecture Coastal Prefecture
mean sd mean sd
Industry employment 74,803 96,497 313,332 406,028
Industry Production (millian yuan) 16,327 29,122 98,394 182,537
Export (millian yuan) 931 1,953 25,905 68,789
Num. of firms 243 295 1,299 1,830
Num. of state owned firm 53 69 104 215
Num. of private firms 174 239 859 1,211
Num. of foreign firm 16 29 336 664
Num. of exporter 28 67 425 709
Average firm revenue(1000 yuan) 60,872 91,822 66,608 45,460
Average exporter revenue(1000 yuan) 298,595 837,624 168,564 222,610
Annual wage (1000 yuan) 11.6 6.7 14.5 33.8
Value added per labor (1000 yuan) 65.0 59.3 73.7 111.7
Exporter VAL (1000 yuan) 78.4 132.0 84.1 264.7
Distance to the seaport(k.m.) 959 707 131 93
Observations 2215 1142
a Data are from Annual Survey of Industrial Firms of China (1998-2007). The firm level data
are aggregated into the prefecture-year cell.
higher increase in manufacturing output after China joined the WTO. Employment
increased by 16.3% more, and the number of firms increased by 17.2% more. Exports
and the number of exporting firms also grew faster in the coastal region. Since the
model predicts that both external and internal trade liberalizations lead to industry
agglomeration in the coastal region, it is not surprising to see industry agglomeration
in the coastal region from the data.
Panel B shows firm convergence between coastal and inland regions. After the
WTO accession, average firm revenue in a prefecture with mean distance to the sea-
port increased 11.5% more than average firm revenue in a prefecture one log distance
closer to the seaport. Exporting probability also increased 0.52 percent more in the
prefecture further away from the seaport. Average firm productivity in terms of value
added per labor and annual wage also increased by 9.27% and 5.1% more, respec-
tively. The results show that after the WTO accession, firms grew faster and average
productivity increased faster in the coastal region than in the inland region. The
exporting probability also increased more for firms in the inland region. We see firm
convergence between coastal and inland regions.
The results in panel B are consistent with the story of internal trade liberaliza-
tions. It suggests that the decrease of internal trade costs is more significant than the
decrease of external trade barriers. Indeed, China’s tariffs had already been decreased
to a low level before its WTO accession, and the tariffs that Chinese exporters faced
did not change much after China joined the WTO. Many countries, including the
US and the EU, had already given China most favored nation (MFN) status before
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Table 2.2: The Heterogeneous effects of the WTO Accession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Industry agglomeration
ln(Output) ln(L) log(num. firm) ln(export)
Distance×WTO -0.0549∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.0686∗∗
(0.0205) (0.0171) (0.0204) (0.0299)
Observations 3357 3329 3357 3099
R2 0.980 0.977 0.963 0.941
Panel B: Firm response
ln(firm revenue) Prob. export ln(VAL) ln(wage)
Distance×WTO 0.111∗∗∗ 0.00523∗∗ 0.0876∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.00251) (0.0170) (0.00864)
Observations 3357 3357 3323 3329
R2 0.896 0.834 0.853 0.837
a Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
b Standard errors clustered at prefecture level.
China joined the WTO, so external trade cost reduction brought about by the WTO
accession is limited. During this period, however, economic reforms and market liber-
alizations greatly reduced internal barriers of trade. A transition from partial opening
up to comprehensive opening up decreased the policy advantage of the coastal region
and encouraged the inland region to participate more in international trade. Large
infrastructure projects were launched to connect the geographically disadvantaged
regions to the world market. Further domestic market integration also decreased in-
ternal trade costs18. These internal liberalizations are more important than tariff and
non-tariff reductions, new market access and other external trade costs reductions
after the WTO accession.
2.4.5 Robustness
Industry Level Evidence
Like other Melitz (2003) type models, the model emphasizes reallocation within
the industry during the trade liberalization. In reality, there are many industries
and the difference between coastal and inland regions could arise from the difference
of economic structure. When different regions have different industry compositions
and different industries have different growth trends, we can see agglomeration in
the coastal region even if trade liberalization has same effects on the coastal and the
inland region within an industry. To check if the above results are driven by industry
18Lu and Tao (2009) find that local protectionism obstructed the industry agglomeration in China.
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composition of different regions, I run the following regression:
yrit = αri + ηit + βln(Distancer)×WTOt + εrit (2.23)
where r is prefecture, i is industry, and t is year. I use prefecture-industry fixed
effect to control for the difference in industry composition between coastal and inland
regions, and use industry-year fixed effect to control for different growth trends of
different industries. Again, I run two sets of regressions: one with industry outcome
variables; the other with firm outcome variables. The results are shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: The Heterogeneous Effects of the WTO Accession (industry level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Industry agglomeration
ln(Output) ln(L) log(num. firm) ln(export)
Distance×WTO -0.0280∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0728∗∗∗ -0.0510∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0198) (0.0139) (0.0198)
Observations 369554 370756 375987 131601
R2 0.852 0.832 0.859 0.810
Panel B: Firm response
ln(firm revenue) Prob. export ln(VAL) ln(wage)
Distance×WTO 0.0445∗∗∗ 0.00906∗∗∗ 0.0749∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗
(0.00865) (0.00338) (0.0161) (0.00639)
Observations 369554 375987 359712 367297
R2 0.799 0.685 0.695 0.682
a Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
b Standard errors clustered at prefecture level.
The industry level results are consistent with the model implications. Even after
controlling for industry composition and different industry trends, the results still
show agglomeration in the coastal region. The coefficient estimates are almost the
same as in the basic specification. This means that the results are indeed driven by
the heterogeneous effects of WTO accession on coastal and inland regions within the
industry. Table 2.3 also shows firm convergence between coastal and inland regions,
and the coefficient estimates are very similar to the results in the basic specification.
This supports the inference that the coastal agglomeration is driven mostly by internal
trade liberalization.
Controlling For Tariff Change
Tariffs have been used extensively as a measure for external trade costs. In this
section, I control for the average export tariff faced by each prefecture. If we still see
agglomeration in the coastal region and firm convergence, we can be more confident
that the results are not driven by external trade liberalization, at least not by tariff
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reduction. The export tariff each prefecture faces is defined as average tariff of all
industries weighted by production.
Tariffrt =
∑
i Tariffit × Productionrit
Productionrt
where i denotes industry. Since the production structure of each prefecture is affected
by the tariff faced, the variable Tariffrt is endogenous. To reduce the endogeneity
problem, I construct an instrumental variable (IV) using the production of the base
year:
TariffIVrt =
∑
i Tariffit × Productionri1998
Productionr1998
I add the constructed tariff variable into equation (2.22) to control for the effects of
tariff reductions. The coefficients on tariffs and the interaction of WTO and distance
are shown in Table 2.4. From the table, we still see industry agglomeration in the
coastal region and firm convergence between coastal and inland regions. Compared
with the base results in Table 2, the magnitude of Distance ×WTO is almost the
same. The results show that the industry agglomeration and firm convergence we
have found are not due to tariff reductions.
Although there may be other kinds of external trade liberalizations not discussed
here, such as quota removal, new market access, etc., the analysis in this section
suggests that external trade liberalization, even if it has an effect, may not be the
primary driver behind the coastal agglomeration.
More General Specification
If the external trade liberalization brought about by WTO accession is not the
main driver behind the coastal agglomeration, and if the coastal agglomeration is
mostly pushed forward by internal reforms and market liberalizations, we should see
gradual industry agglomeration and firm convergence. To capture the effects of the
market liberalization in different years, I run a more flexible specification:
yrt = αr + γt +
2007∑
t=1998
βtDistancer × Y eart + εrt (2.24)
where Y eart is the dummy for year t. The coefficient can be interpreted as the
difference between the coastal and the inland region in year t compared with the base
year, year 1998.
The change in βs over time are shown in Figure 3.8. The solid lines show the
time trend of the coefficient β, and the dashed lines show the 95% confidence inter-
vals. From the figure, we see gradual industry agglomeration in the coastal region.
Manufacturing output, manufacturing employment and number of firms grew faster
in the coastal region than in the inland region during the whole period. Export grew
faster in the coastal region between 1998 to 2001. The trend reversed between 2002
to 2004, but the coastal region regained momentum since 2005.
The lower 4 figures show firm responses during this period. Firm revenue grew
29
Table 2.4: The Heterogeneous Effects of the WTO Accession (with tariff control)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Industrial agglomeration
ln(Output) ln(L) log(num. firm) ln(export)
Export Tariff -0.00950 -0.0107 -0.0325∗∗∗ -0.0286
(0.0106) (0.00803) (0.00836) (0.0196)
Distance×WTO -0.0595∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.0709∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0161) (0.0190) (0.0282)
Observations 3290 3262 3290 3045
R2 0.980 0.976 0.962 0.942
F 146.309 145.374 146.309 154.164
Panel B: Firm response
ln(firm revenue) Prob. export ln(VAL) ln(wage)
Export Tariff 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.000838 0.0138∗ -0.00249
(0.00847) (0.00105) (0.00830) (0.00436)
Distance×WTO 0.0984∗∗∗ 0.00516∗∗ 0.0831∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.00243) (0.0164) (0.00819)
Observations 3290 3290 3259 3262
R2 0.900 0.832 0.851 0.836
F 146.309 146.309 145.322 145.374
a Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
b Standard errors clustered at prefecture level.
c F is the first-stage F statistic.
faster in the coastal region than in the inland region, and the trend became more sig-
nificant after 2002. Before 2002, exporting probability in the inland region decreased
compared to the coastal region, but the trend reversed after 2003. Valued added
per worker and annual wage increased faster in the inland region than in the coastal
region during the whole period.
Overall, the figure shows industry agglomeration and firm convergence over the
entire period. However, there does not seem to be an abrupt change of trends after
China joined the WTO. The results are more consistent with the story that gradual
internal reforms and market liberalizations, rather than external trade liberalizations,
are the primary drivers behind the coastal agglomeration.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper introduced internal geography into the heterogeneous firm model to
study the effects of trade and trade liberalization on coastal and inland regions. I
show that opening up to international trade leads to industry agglomeration in the
coastal region and causes firms in the coastal region to have a higher productivity.
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Both internal and external trade liberalizations lead to industry agglomeration in the
coastal region. External trade liberalizations leads to firm divergence, and internal
trade liberalizations leads to firm convergence between coastal and inland regions.
Using Chinese data from 1998 to 2007, I find that manufacturing firms agglomer-
ated in the coastal region, and that firms converged between the coastal and inland
regions. The results suggest that internal trade liberalization had a more significant
effect during the study period. For many developing countries, external integration is
accompanied by internal liberalizations. The model suggests a way to weigh the rela-
tive importance of external and internal trade liberalization, and also to help explain
why the benefits of opening up go beyond the usual external trade cost reduction.
It should be noted that the agglomeration force in my model is the hub effect, not
the home market effect. The location advantage is the driving force for the industry
agglomeration and higher productivity in the coastal region. In reality, both the home
market effect and the hub effect exist. If the coastal region has a larger market than
the inland region, the home market effect could also induce industry to agglomerate
in the coastal region, but it would not caused the coastal region to have a higher
productivity. The higher average productivity in the coastal region also suggest that
the hub effect is the primary force at work.
Since we do not assume migration between the coastal and the inland region,
industry relocation occurs through free migration between agriculture and industry
sectors. When migration is allowed, there will be another channel of agglomeration,
and we would expect a faster agglomeration process when trade costs decrease. In
the empirical section, we do see that industry employment agglomerated faster than
industry output. Since the household registration system discourages migrants from
living permanently where they work (Chan and Zhang (1999)) , it could cause a sepa-
ration of employment and consumption and reduce the agglomeration of production.
How to model the household registration system and how it affects China’s industrial
agglomeration is an interesting topic for future research.
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Figure 2.7: Trends before and after the WTO accession
Notes:The solid line shows the trend of the coastal region, and the dashed line shows the trend of the
inland region. I exclude Henan province in 2005 and 2006 because the number of exporters is too
large in these two years and they are not consistent with the data before 2005 or after 2006.
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Figure 2.8: Trends of the Difference between Coastal and Inland Regions
Notes: The figure show the trend of Distancer×Y eart. The base year is 1998. The solid line depicts
β from regression (2.24), and the dashed lines show 95% confidence interval.
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Chapter 3 The Border Effect of China’s East/Non-east Divide
3.1 Introduction
It is not new that country borders could cause large economic discontinuities
(Pinkovskiy (2017)). At the beginning of Why nations fail, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2013) use the stark contrast between two towns at the US-Mexico border to mo-
tivate the theme of their book that institution rules. The satellite night light map
of Korean Peninsula is also often used to show the effect of country borders on eco-
nomic development. However, within-country economic discontinuities have received
less attention. In this paper, I document the large economic discontinuities across
the east/non-east provincial borders in China, and shows that the economic discon-
tinuities are correlated with openness level and index of market liberalization at the
provincial level.
The reasons to choose China are twofold. First, China is a diverse country with
substantial variations in local government policies. China’s economy is highly decen-
tralized, and subnational governments actively participate in economic development
(Xu (2011)). Thus, subnational policies could have large effects on the local economy,
and the effects of different policies are most evident on the borders. Second, China’s
economic reform began from east (coastal) provinces, and coastal provinces have re-
ceived preferential policies in international trade and economic development. Since
the economic reform, east provinces have been growing faster than non-east provinces.
The large variation of government policies provides an opportunity to examine the
effects of subnational policies on China’s east/non-east divide.
I took 4 plains provinces in China, among which two are coastal provinces in the
east and the other two are in the non-east. There is no geographic barrier between
the 4 provinces. I show that there are significant discontinuities of manufacturing
activities across the east/non-east provincial borders. The east has significantly higher
manufacturing employment, production, and export. By using only counties that are
contiguous to the east/non-east provincial borders, I find that the eastern counties
have 87% higher manufacturing production, 80% higher manufacturing employment,
and 106% higher manufacturing export than the western counties. Meanwhile, the
eastern counties have a lower share of the rural population, a higher exporting share,
and a higher share of manufacturing output by foregin firms. I also find the border
discontinuities account for a large proportion of the gaps between east and non-east
provinces.
Next, I show that the border effects are larger for non-state sectors than for the
state sector, and are stronger in non-mountain regions than in mountain regions. Since
the state sector is under the direct control of the government and China’s industrial
policies had long favored inland over coastal regions before its economic reform, the
distribution of state-owned firms is less affected by provincial reform and openness
levels. Thus, we see smaller economic discontinuities in the state sector. The place-
based preferential policies, although good for export and industry development, only
34
works if the regions have good access to the world market. Thus, for counties in
plain regions, the eastern counties have a higher level of manufacturing density than
the western counties because of the better policies; in mountain regions, preferential
policies do not work well and counties on both sides of provincial borders have a low
level of manufacturing activities.
At last, I provide some direct evidence that openness level and index of market
liberalization at the provincial level can account for a large part of the east/non-east
divide. I use the number of national economic and technological development zones
(ETDZs) within a province as a measure of openness level and show that the higher
openness level is associated with higher manufacturing densities. I also use Gang
Fan’s market index as a measure of market liberalization and show that counties
with a higher level of market liberalization is also associated with higher level of
manufacturing activities.
This paper documents economic discontinuities across the east/non-east provin-
cial borders in China, and points to the importance of provincial policies, or “local
institutions”. Acemoglu and Dell (2010) document substantial within-country (and
cross-municipality) difference in output and standards of living for countries in Latin
America. They argue that the large within-country income difference can be ex-
plained by local institutions that influence how local and regional collective decisions
are made, how the lower level of government interact with the national government,
and how political power is distributed at the local level. For countries as diverse as
China, it seems that local policies are important to explain regional differences. Xu
(2011) and many others have emphasized the regional decentralization of economic af-
fairs in understanding China’s economic growth and regional inequalities. Since many
economic affairs are delegated to subnational governments, different provinces could
adopt different development strategies. Conditional on that local protectionism is se-
vere and inter-provincial trade and migration barriers are substantial, provincial-level
policy differences could cause economic discontinuities at the borders.
One significant policy difference between the coastal and the inland region is
that the coastal region received many preferential policies in international trade and
economic development. Démurger et al. (2002) and many earlier works have shown
that preferential policies received by coastal provinces are important to explain the
higher growth of the coastal region. Recent research such as Wang (2013) and Alder
et al. (2015) have examined directly the effects of the “place-based policy” on local
economic development. This paper takes a different approach by comparing counties
contiguous to the east/non-east borders, where the east have preferential policies of
openness and trade. The regression discontinuity design identifies the border effect
caused by policy differences.
The paper is also related to the literature studying China’s coastal/inland divide
(or east/non-east divide), and how the regional inequality is related to China’s eco-
nomic reform and openness. China’s opening-up policy has been proved successful.
However, the incremental opening-up policy has also been criticized for increasing re-
gional inequalities between the coast and the inland.(Demurger et al. (2002)) Studies
examining the relationship between preferential policies and regional inequalities have
to control for geographic factors, since the coastal provinces have better geographic
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conditions (infrastructure, location, etc) than inland provinces. One major difficulty
is to find good measures of geographic factors that contribute to local development.
This paper avoids this difficulty by comparing counties with similar (if not the same)
geographic conditions (and also culture), so the difference across the border has to
be mainly explained by policy differences.
The idea of using border approach to identify policy effects is not new, and it has
been particularly popular since the pioneering work of Holmes (1998). However, when
applying the border approach to study the regional inequalities between the east and
the non-east of China, it is important to note that we are not identifying the effect of a
specific policy, but a general political border effect. The border effect is not explained
by geographical or cultural factors. The abrupt change of manufacturing activities
across the east/non-east provincial borders can be attributed to the difference in
openness level and market liberalization at the provincial level.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I explain why I choose the 4 plains
provinces in my main analysis, and argue that there is no geographic or cultural
discontinuity across the borders. Section 3 documents the economic discontinuities
across the borders. Section 4 discusses the heterogeneities of the border effect. Sec-
tor 5 examines the possible explanations for the border effect. Sector 6 does some
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Geography and Culture
In the main analysis, I choose 4 adjacent provinces in plain regions of China,
Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu and Shandong (shown in Figure 4.1). Jiangsu and Shandong
are coastal provinces in the east; Anhui and Henan are neighboring provinces in the
non-east (I thus call them the western provinces). The 4 provinces are mainly plains.
There is no mountain standing between Anhui-Henan and Jiangsu-Shandong.
Three big rivers run through these provinces. All of them flow from the west to
the east. The Yellow River runs through Henan and Shandong Province. The Huai
River runs through the south of Henan, and the north of Anhui and Jiangsu province.
The Yangtze River runs through the south of Anhui and Jiangsu province. Although
a small part of the Henan-Shandong border is along the Yellow River, in general, the
border between Anhui-Henan and Jiangsu-Shandong is not along the rivers.
Figure 3.2 shows elevations of the counties in these four plains provinces. Most of
the counties have an average elevation below 100 meters. The western counties have
relatively high elevations, and the eastern counties have relatively low elevations.
Although the western provinces have a higher elevation, counties contiguous to the
provincial borders are all in plains and their elevations are below 100m. There is no
abrupt change in elevation across the provincial border. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2
show that geographic conditions do not change discontinuously across the border.
The province as the first-level administration unit under the central government
came into shape in China in the Yuan Dynasty (13th century). Anhui and Jiangsu
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Figure 3.1: Counties in the Plains Provinces and the Border Counties
used to belong to the same province1 in the Ming and Qing dynasty (14-17th century),
and its size is equivalent to today’s Jiangsu and Anhui combined. In 1666, Emperor
Kangxi divided the Jiangnan province into Anhui and Jiangsu province, and the
boundaries of them were very similar to today’s boundaries. (Tan (1987)) However,
the Qing dynasty did not divide Jiangnan province according to geographic or cultural
similarities, but instead divided it out of concern for maintaining political stability.
At that time, China’s economic center had already moved to the Yangtze river valley
from the Yellow river valley, and the south of Jiangnan province was more prosperous
than the north. The economic and cultural differences between the north and the
south are much greater than the differences between the east and the west. Yet,
Jiangnan province was divided into a east province and a west province, so that both
provinces have a rich south and a poor north part. A side effect relevant to this study
is that counties contiguous to the provincial border between Jiangsu and Anhui are
similar in cultural and economic conditions.
Henan and Shandong province were established in the Ming dynasty, and their
boundaries have been relatively stable. Although the borders between the two provinces
have changed, most of the times it is for the convenience of harnessing the Yellow
1It was called Nan Zhili in Ming dynasty and Jiangnan in Qing dynasty.
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Figure 3.2: Elevations of the Plain Counties
River, a much-troubled river that has caused floods constantly.
Since the boundaries of the four provinces are set long before China’s industrial
development, there is no reason to worry that the borders are set to separate regions
with different levels of industrial development. However, there is also a concern that
culture might be different among those provinces, and cultural difference can also lead
to economic discontinuities at the border.2 While I do not have a direct measure of
culture, there are several reasons to believe that cultural differences across provincial
borders are small. First, culture tends to develop and transmit along the river. All
the three big rivers run from the west to the east. So culture in north of Henan is
similar to the culture in Shandong; culture in the north of Anhui is similar to that
in the north of Jiangsu; culture in the south of Anhui and Jiangsu province are also
similar. Second, provincial borders were not set according to economic or cultural
similarities, especially in the case of Anhui-Jiangsu border. There is no reason to
believe that culture changes suddenly across the border. Figure 3.3 shows the dialect
map of the plains provinces. A dialect is spoken by a group of people with similar
culture. Thus, it can be used to measure culture similarities. Looking at the dialect
map in these four provinces, people in most places north of the Yangtze River speak
Mandarin; people in the south of the Yangtze River speak other dialects. The cultural
2For example, Ma (2017) finds that regions that are in the same dialect area with Hong Kong
receive more foreign direct investment than regions that are outside the same dialect area.
38
Figure 3.3: Dialects in the Plains Provinces
difference between the north and the south is greater than the cultural difference
between the east and the west. The Mandarin speaking region can be further divided
into several sub-dialect regions (Zhongyuan, Jianghuai, Liaojiao, and Jilu Mandarin
region). Even the borders of these subgroup dialects do not overlap with provincial
borders. This gives us more confidence that even if there is a culture discontinuity
between provinces, it does not appear at the provincial borders.
The above analysis shows that the east/non-east provincial borders are not deter-
mined by geographic barriers, were set long before China’s industrial development,
and culture does not change across the border. Thus, if we see a significant disconti-
nuity of manufacturing activities across the provincial border, if must not be due to
geographic or cultural differences.
3.3 Economic Discontinuities Across the Provincial Border
3.3.1 Population and Agriculture Production
The four plains provinces are important agricultural provinces. Henan and Shan-
dong province mainly produce wheat, while the South of Jiangsu and Anhui plant
rice. The plains provinces are also the most populated regions in China. Shandong
has the 2nd largest population in China. Henan ranks 3rd, Jiangsu ranks 5th, and
Anhui ranks 8th in population. (2010 population census)
In the agricultural economy, grain production is the most important economic ac-
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tivity and counties tend to be self-sufficient. Thus, political border would not cause
discontinuity of economic activities if it were not along geographic barriers (such as
mountains). In graph 1 and 2 of Figure 3.4, it shows that there is no discontinuity in
both elevation and ruggedness (measured by standard deviation of elevation) across
the east/non-east border. The geographic conditions are not significantly different
across the border. Thus, we should not expect agriculture productivity to be dif-
ferent.The third graph shows no discontinuity in grain production across provincial
borders.
The last graph in Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of population. Although the
east counties have more population, the difference is not statistically significant.3
Part of the reason is that most of the population in the counties are agricultural
population. Since geographic conditions do not change abruptly, so do agricultural
production and agricultural population. The household registration system further
restricts migration across regions. Thus, the population distribution today (to some
extent) still resembles the distribution of agricultural population.
3.3.2 Economic Discontinuity
Although agricultural production and population show little evidence of disconti-
nuity across the border, manufacturing activities and export are statistically different
once crossing the border from the non-east to the east.
Under China’s current political system, economic affairs are largely decentralized
to sub-national governments.4 Different provinces may have different policies on inter-
national trade and economic development, and political borders can cause domestic
market segregation5. Since China’s economic reform began from the coastal region,
coastal provinces were given preferential policies in trade and industry development.
Border counties in the east provinces have better policies in trade and industry de-
velopment than border counties in the west, even if they have similar geographic
conditions and the same culture. Border counties in the eastern provinces also ben-
efit more from technology and production spillover from port regions. Thus, there is
a reason to conjecture that there is a discontinuity of industry activities across the
borders between east (coastal) provinces and non-east provinces.
Figure 3.5 shows the discontinuity of industry activities across the border. The
share of rural population is lower in eastern provinces and there is an abrupt decrease
across provincial borders. This means that the level of industrialization is immediately
different across the border. The second and the third graph show that manufacturing
output and manufacturing employment are higher on the east side than on the west
3It is not significant at 10% significance level when running both parametric and non-parametric
estimation.
4Subnational governments spend about 70% of all fiscal expenditure.(Wong et al. (2008))
5There has been intensive research on the relationship between China’s economic reform and
domestic market segregation.Young (2000) argues that economic reform increase market segregation,
while Holz (2009) did not find that. Nonetheless, there is a consensus that the local protection is
significant and inter-regional trade costs are high in China (Bai et al. (2004)).
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Figure 3.4: (Dis)continuities Across the Border
Notes: The graphs show the scatter plot between Y and distance to the borderline. The bin is set to
be 20 km. Each point denotes the mean of observations within that bin. Quartic fitting lines with
95% confidence intervals are also included.
side of the border. Manufacturing export is also significantly higher on the east of
the provincial border. Exporting share does not seem to increase abruptly across
the border. However, from the last graph, it shows that the eastern provinces have a
higher share of foreign output. This indicates that foreign firms play a more significant
role in eastern counties than western counties.
3.3.3 Economic Geography in the Plains Provinces
To have a better picture of the distribution of manufacturing activities in the
plains provinces, I draw the distribution of manufacturing production, manufacturing
export, and the number of manufacturing firms.
Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of manufacturing output in 2007. There is a
sharp contrast between the eastern provinces and the western provinces, especially on
the south border of Anhui and Jiangsu province. Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of
manufacturing export in 2007, and Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of manufacturing
firms in 2007. All the figures show the same pattern: the eastern provinces have a
much higher economic density than the western provinces. This is not surprising, as
eastern provinces have better access to the world market, and enjoy better policies in
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Figure 3.5: Economic Discontinuities Across the Border
Notes: The graphs shows the scatter plots between Y and distance to the borderline. The bin is set
to be 20 km. Each point the mean of observations within that bin. Quartic lines with 95% confidence
intervals are also included.
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Figure 3.6: Manufacturing Output in 2007
Notes: The graph depicts manufacturing production (measured in million yuan) in
each county in 2007.
international trade. What is surprising is the sharp contrast of manufacturing density
at the provincial borders. The density of manufacturing activities (both production
and export) decreases from the coast to inland region, and drop shapely once crossing
the east/non-east provincial borders.
Next, I compare counties in the western provinces with counties in the eastern
provinces; I also select counties contiguous to the east/non-east border and compare
counties in the east with counties in the west. Table 3.1 shows the comparisons.
The first two columns compare all counties in the western provinces (Anhui, Henan)
with counties in the eastern provinces (Jiangsu, Shandong). The last two columns
use only counties contiguous to the provincial borders and compares counties in the
west with counties in the east. The counties in both the eastern and the western
provinces have similar size of the population. However, manufacturing production and
employment are much higher in the eastern provinces than in the western provinces.
Manufacturing employment in the east is about 4 times as high as that in the west.
Manufacturing production is more than 5 times as high. Manufacturing export is
nearly 20 times as high. Looking at the last two columns, A large part of the gap
between the eastern and the western counties appears at the border. Manufacturing
employment on the east of the border is nearly 4 times as high as that on the west of
the border. Manufacturing production is more than 5 times as high. Manufacturing
export is nearly 9 times as high.
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Figure 3.7: Manufacturing Export in 2007
Figure 3.8: Number of Manufacturing Firms in 2007
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Table 3.1: Comparison between Counties in the East and the Non-east
Non-east County East County west of border east of border
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Industry employment 10,984 8,941 43,296 51,685 9,125 5,940 28,727 27,611
Industry Production (millian yuan) 2,296 3,270 13,981 26,814 2,013 2,451 8,031 13,621
Export (millian yuan) 124 240 2,463 9,950 125 228 663 1,218
Num. of firms 48 35 184 220 48 29 135 164
Output Share(SOE) 0.18 0.22 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.14 0.20
Output Share(PE) 0.76 0.23 0.71 0.21 0.77 0.24 0.75 0.21
Output Share(FE) 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.14
Exporting share 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07
exporting probability 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.11
Rural Pop. Share 0.87 0.07 0.83 0.07 0.86 0.05 0.83 0.06
Population (10,000) 75.47 36.23 80.66 31.54 72.39 26.13 88.72 27.19
Distance port 456.56 148.47 154.70 93.95 289.39 85.71 260.18 96.74
Altitude Mean(m) 161.1 194.2 50.9 70.8 47.1 23.8 35.9 15.8
Altitude Std(m) 77.12 96.04 25.03 37.04 22.95 30.13 12.43 16.35
Observations 1901 1671 260 210
1 The table pooled data from different years. Industry employment to exporting probability are from Annual
Survey of Industrial Firms (1998-2007); Rural Pop. Share and Population are from County Census Yearbook
(2002-2004; 2006;2007). Rural Pop. Share is the share of population with agricultural household registration
(agricultural hukou).
2 The first column includes all counties in Henan and Anhui, the second column includes all counties in Jiangsu
and Shandong; the last two columns includes only counties that are contiguous to the east/non-east provincial
border.
3 OutputShare(SOE) is the production share of state owned firms. OutputShare(PE) is the production
share of private firms. OutputShare(FE) is the production share of foreign firms. ExportingShare is the
share of manufacturing production that is exported. ExportingProbability is the share of firms participating
in export.
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Economic structure is also different between the east and the west. Counties
in the eastern provinces have a lower share of rural population. On average, the
share of rural population is 87% in the western provinces and 83% in the eastern
provinces. Across the border from the west to the east, the share of rural population
decreased from 86% to 83%. Counties in the eastern provinces also have a higher
share of foreign production and a higher exporting share. On average, manufacturing
production share of foreign firms (Output Share (FE)) is 6% in the west, and it is 15%
in the east. Economic structure also seems to change abruptly across the provincial
borders. Across the border from the west to the east, the production share of foreign
firms increases from 6% to 10%. The exporting share is 6% in the western provinces,
and it is 13% in the eastern provinces. However, the exporting share only increases
from 6% to 8% across the provincial borders.
Overall, counties in the eastern provinces have a much higher manufacturing den-
sity than those in the western provinces. And the provincial border accounts for a
large part of the gap between the east and the non-east.
3.3.4 The Border Effect
To quantify the effects of provincial borders, I run a regression using only counties
contiguous to the east/non-east provincial borders. The regression equation specified
as:
yrt = β0 +β1Eastr +β2distancer +β3elevationr +β4anhuijiangsur + γt + εrpt (3.1)
where Eastr is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a county is on the east side of the
border, distancer is the distance (km) of a county to the nearest seaport. elevationr
is the average elevation of a county. Although I choose my sample to be counties
contiguous to the provincial borders to avoid geographic differences between the east
and the east, there could still be some small geographic differences. I include distance
to the seaport and elevation to control for possible difference in access to the world
market and trade costs to other regions. anhuijiangsur is a dummy variable that
equals one for counties in Anhui and Jiangsu province. The variable is included to
control for the border segment fixed effect.
Table 3.2: The Border Effect of Economic Development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foreign Share
East -0.0322∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗ 0.0230 0.0601∗
(0.0166) (0.230) (0.201) (0.368) (0.0190) (0.0338)
Observations 293 466 466 423 466 466
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
I examine the border effects for the following six variables that measure the in-
dustry development: share of rural population, manufacturing output, manufactur-
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ing employment, manufacturing export, exporting share, production share by foreign
firms. Table 3.2 shows the effects of provincial borders on industrial development.
Crossing the provincial border from the west to the east, a county’s share of rural pop-
ulation decreases by 3%; manufacturing output increases by 87%, manufacturing em-
ployment increases by 80%, and manufacturing export increases by 106%. Although
exporting share of manufacturing products does not change much (2.3%) across the
border, production share of foreign firms (column 6) increases by 6% from the west
to the east of the border. This means that foreign firms play a more important role
in the east than in the west.
Table 3.2 shows large discontinuities across the east/non-east borders. How much
do the discontinuities at the border account for the provincial gap? I next run the
following equation:
yrpt = β0 + β1ypt + β2distancer + β3elevationr + β4anhuijiangsur + γt + εrpt (3.2)
where yrpt is the response variable in county r, province p and year t; ypt is the average
y in province p and year t.6 The coefficient β1 measures the share of provincial level
difference that can be accounted for by the gap between border counties.7 The results
are in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: The Border Effect as a Share of the Provincial Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foreign Share
Ypt 0.698∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.221 0.368∗
(0.297) (0.120) (0.132) (0.124) (0.167) (0.201)
Observations 293 466 466 423 466 466
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
From Table 3.3, the border gap accounts for about 70% of the difference in rural
population share between provinces, more than half of the difference in manufacturing
production and employment, and about 37% of the difference in manufacturing export
between provinces. It also explains 37% of the difference in foreign firm production
share between east and non-east provinces.
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show the large manufacturing discontinuities across the
provincial borders. The large east/non-east divide is unlikely to be explained by
geographic conditions and cultures, as we show in the previous section that geographic
conditions and culture do not change abruptly across the provincial border. Table
6I also tried to exclude counties contiguous to the east/noneast border and use the remaining
counties to compute provincial average ypt. It does not change the main results. The results are in
the appendix.
7Compare a border country r1 in the eastern province p1 with a border county r2 in the western
province p2, β1 =
yr1p1t−yr2p2t
yp1t−yp2t
, which is the ratio of cross-county difference over cross-province
difference. It gives a measure of how large the border gap compared to the provincial gap.
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3.3 also shows that a border county is more similar to the average country within the
same province than the neighboring counties in the other province. This indicates
that provincial level policy variables can probably account for the large border effects.
3.4 Heterogeneity in the Border Effect
3.4.1 State and Non-state sectors
China’s economic reform and openness started by letting non-state sectors to
grow. The state sector is under direct control of the government and state-owned
firms are more evenly distributed across the country8. However, the development of
non-state sectors is “outside the control”. The eastern provinces experienced a higher
growth in non-state sectors than the western provinces since the economic reform and
openness. Since the economic reform and opening-up was first initiated in the coastal
region, the coastal (and eastern) provinces also have a better policy environment for
the development of non-state sectors. Thus, we except to see a large discontinuity in
non-state sectors, but a small discontinuity in the state sector.
In Table 3.4, I divide industrial output into state-owned (SOE) sector, private
(PE) sector, and foreign (FE) sector, and run regression (3.1) for each sector sep-
arately. For both private sector and foreign sector (non-state sectors), there are
significant discontinuities across the east/non-east borders for manufacturing output,
manufacturing employment, and manufacturing export (column 4-9). The disconti-
nuity seems to be stronger in the foreign sector. Indeed, China’s incremental reform
strategy gave the coastal region a lot of preferential policies in economic development
and international trade. All those policies encourage the development of non-state
economy, attract foreign investment, and promote international trade. Those poli-
cies could lead to non-state sector to develop faster in the coastal region than in
the inland region. In the state sector, however, the manufacturing discontinuity is
not statistically significant (column 1-3). Since the distribution of state-owned firms
is more affected by government policies, and China’s industrial policy before eco-
nomic reform focus on self-sufficiency and regional equality, the distribution of the
state sector is more evenly distributed and we do not see a discontinuity across the
east/non-east borders. The results indicate that difference in reform and openness
level since the economic reform can account for the large economic discontinuities
across the east/non-east borders.
8Actually, before China’s economic reform, government’s industrial plans favored the inland
regions over the coastal regions, for fear of wars.
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Table 3.4: Border Effect of Economic Development (by Ownership)
State sector Private sector Foreign sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Output Employment Export Output Employment Export Output Employment Export
East 0.793 0.579 1.269 0.841∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗ 1.305∗∗∗ 1.324∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗
(0.483) (0.395) (0.937) (0.266) (0.239) (0.406) (0.324) (0.287) (0.290)
Observations 379 379 134 465 466 391 385 386 286
R2 0.206 0.413 0.179 0.579 0.420 0.257 0.452 0.403 0.398
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.4.2 Borders in the Plain and Borders in the Mountain
In the previous section, I use only counties contiguous to the borders of the plains
provinces. The reason is to avoid confounding factors that could also cause economic
discontinuities, such as differences in geographic conditions and cultures. When there
is no geographic barrier, and cultures are similar, economic discontinuities across the
borders can be attributed to policy differences. However, the preferential policies
also need favorable locations to function well.9 Previous literature, such as Demurger
et al. (2002), have emphasized the importance of both geographic conditions and
preferential policies, but has not examined the interaction of these two forces. Here, I
use the whole east/non-east border, and check if the border effect differs by geographic
conditions.
Figure 3.9 depicts the borders between the east and the non-east of China. Some
parts of the east/non-east border are in the plain regions, and other parts are in
the mountainous regions. I define mountain counties as counties with an average
elevation of 500 meters or higher and their neighboring counties on the other side of
the east/non-east border. There are 195 border counties, 83 counties are counted as
mountain counties, and 112 counties are non-mountain counties. An interesting fact
is that for mountain borders, both counties in the east and counties in the west have
high elevations, and thus less favorable conditions for industrial development.
I divide counties contiguous to the east/non-east provincial borders into a moun-
tain sample and a non-mountain sample (shown in Figure 3.9). I then run regression
(3.1) with the whole sample, the mountain sample, and the non-mountain sample re-
spectively. The results are shown in Table 3.5. For the whole sample (Panel A), there
is an east/non-east border effect in manufacturing output, manufacturing export,
exporting share, and production share of foreign firms. Manufacturing output in-
creases by 26.4% from the non-east to the east; manufacturing employment increases
by 10.1%; manufacturing export increases by 71.3%; exporting share increases by
4.15%; production share of foreign firms increases by 6.01%. In general, there are
large economic discontinuities across the east/non-east borders.
However, results in Panel B and Panel C show that the border effects are very
different between mountain borders and non-mountain borders. For the mountain
sample, the eastern counties do not have statistically higher manufacturing output,
manufacturing employment, and manufacturing export than counties in the west.
Yet, they still have higher exporting shares and higher production share by foreign
firms. As we know, preferential policies in the eastern provinces promote industrial
development, but a region’s industry development also depends on its geographic con-
ditions. For mountain counties, even if they enjoy preferential policies, that would not
9One only need to look at Guangdong province, the first province to implement the opening-
up policy. While its GDP size has increased to be the largest since China’s economic reform, Its
growth is unbalanced. Most of growth is due to the development of the Pearl River Delta, which is
adjacent to Hong Kong, and also close to the world market. Its mountainous north and west regions
are among the poorest and most underdeveloped regions in China. For example, Shenzhen’s GDP
per capita is more than 7 times of Meizhou, a city in north Guangdong.
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Figure 3.9: Counties Contiguous to the East/non-east Borders
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Table 3.5: The Border Effect of Manufacturing Development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foregin Share
Panel A: Whole sample
East 0.264∗ 0.101 0.713∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.130) (0.209) (0.0173) (0.0213)
Observations 1892 1877 1373 1892 1892
R2 0.599 0.485 0.445 0.293 0.283
Panel B: Mountain sample
East -0.0855 -0.124 0.510 0.0492∗ 0.0752∗∗
(0.252) (0.212) (0.370) (0.0257) (0.0369)
Observations 804 794 463 804 804
R2 0.488 0.326 0.318 0.169 0.235
Panel C: Non-Mountain sample
East 0.425∗∗ 0.178 0.747∗∗∗ 0.0301 0.0499∗
(0.173) (0.165) (0.246) (0.0255) (0.0279)
Observations 1088 1083 910 1088 1088
R2 0.611 0.451 0.496 0.365 0.357
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
overcome their natural disadvantages, and thus we do not find significant difference in
manufacturing activities across the borders. However, it seems that the preferential
policies do attract more foreign firms, and the eastern counties have a higher share
of production by foreign firms, and also a higher exporting share.
For the non-mountain sample, the counties in the east have significantly higher
manufacturing output, manufacturing employment, manufacturing export, and pro-
duction share of foreign firms than counties in the west. Comparing Panel A with
Panel C, it can be seen that the east/non-east border effect for the whole sample
is mostly driven by the non-mountain part. When there is no obvious geographic
barrier, preferential policies have a large effect on industrial development. The east
counties enjoy preferential policies, and thus have a higher manufacturing density.10
When elevations are high, trade costs are high and the counties are not suitable for
industrial development. Thus, the preferential policies do not have a significant effect
on industrial development and we do not see an east/non-east divide in mountainous
regions.
10It should also be noted that our plain sample is a part of the non-mountain sample, where the
border effects are the strongest.
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3.5 The Border Effects Explained
The above analysis shows there are economic discontinuities across the east/non-
east provincial borders, and it points to the possibility that different polices between
the eastern and the western provinces caused the economic discontinuities across the
border. However, I did not provide any direct measure of policies in previous sections.
In this section, I try to find some policy measures and examine if the policy differences
across provincial borders help to explain the east/non-east economic discontinuities.
3.5.1 Opening-up Policy
China’s economic reform and openness began from the coastal region. In 1980,
four special economic zones were established in the coastal Guangdong and Fujian
provinces to experiment with the market economy and to integrate into the world
economy. In 1984, China further opened up 14 coastal cities. In the late 1980s, China
set up the policy of “coastal development strategy” to open up the whole coastal
region, hoping to extend the opening-up policy to more regions and push forward
the economic reform.(Yang (1991)) By now, all regions in China have opened up to
international trade, but the coastal region still enjoys better policies in international
trade. All the special economic zones are in the coastal region. There are more
National Technology and Development Zones (ETDZs)11 in the east. And many of
the reform and opening-up policies are implemented in the coastal region first. The
east (and coastal) provinces still have considerable policy advantages over the non-
east provinces.
While it is hard to measure the openness level of a province precisely, I use the
number of National Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) as a
proxy for the openness level of the province. ETDZs are small zones within cities that
enjoy many of the policies of special economic zones, including tax benefit, preferential
land policies, and protection of private properties(Wang (2013)). The distribution of
ETDZs is concentrated in the coastal regions. The first 14 ETDZs opened in 1980s are
all in coastal provinces. By 2016, there are 219 ETDZs in China, and every province
has at least one ETDZ. In 2016, Jiangsu has 26 ETDZs, and Shandong has 15; the
non-east Anhui and Henan province have only 12 and 9 ETDZs respectively.
To examine the relationship between openness level and manufacturing activity, I
run equation (3.1) but replacing the dummy variable East with the level of openness
variable (number of ETDZs). The results are shown in Table 3.6.
During the sample period from 1998 to 2007, Anhui province started with 1 ETDZ
in 1998, and ended up with 2 ETDZs in 2008; the number of ETDZs in Henan
increased from 0 to 2; in the eastern provinces, the number of ETDZs increase from
4 to 5 for Jiangsu, and the number of ETDZs stays constant at 5 for Shandong
province. The eastern provinces have a mean number of ETDZs of 4.79, and the
11ETDZs can be seen as smaller special economic zones that focus on attracting foreign direct
investment and export. They are usually located in cities.
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Table 3.6: Openness and the Border Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foreign Share
ETDZ -0.00881∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.00797 0.0151∗
(0.00471) (0.0611) (0.0529) (0.0981) (0.00554) (0.00893)
Observations 293 466 466 423 466 466
R2 0.281 0.552 0.389 0.325 0.088 0.108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
western provinces have a mean number of ETDZs of 1.51. Looking at Table 3.6,
openness level has a negative effect on rural population share, and positive effects
on manufacturing output, manufacturing employment, manufacturing export, and
production share of foreign firms. The gaps in openness level between the east and
the west can account for 2.9% of the difference in rural population share between
the east and the west12, 60.7% of the difference in manufacturing output, 60.7% of
the difference in manufacturing employment, 88% of the difference in manufacturing
export, and 5% of the difference in production share of foreign firms. Compare the
results of Table 3.2, we can see that openness level can account for a large part of the
east/non-east divide.
Of course, there is another interpretation of the number of ETDZs. The number
of ETDZs can also be seen as a measure of the strength of spillover effects.13 If
provincial borders prevent the spillover effects of ETDZs, the counties in provinces
with more ETDZs will benefit more from ETDZ spillovers than counties in provinces
with less number of ETDZs. Thus, the east/non-east divide can also be interpreted
as the different level of spillover effects from openness centers.
3.5.2 Market Liberalization
China’s reform and opening-up policies are mainly market liberalization policies.
Indeed, the whole aim of the market reform is to establish the “socialist market econ-
omy”14. Since the eastern provinces were opened up first and they enjoy preferential
policies, counties in the east have a higher level of market liberalization than counties
in the west. The higher level of market liberalization could cause border counties in
the east to have more manufacturing activities than those in the west.
To measure the level of market liberalization, I include the market index by Fan
et al. (2003). The Fan market index gives each province a synthetic index of market
liberalization based on the following five aspects: (1) Government intervention of
the market; (2) Development of non-state sectors; (3) Development of final product
12Since the east has 3.28 more ETDZs, and one more ETDZ is associated with 0.881% decrease
of rural population share, the openness gap implies a difference of 2.9% in rural population share.
13None of the border counties in the sample has an ETDZ.
14It is stated in the 14th China Communist Party’s National Congress in 1992.
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market; (4) Development of factor market; (5) Development of market intermediates.
As a widely used index of market liberalization, it gives a measure of how resources
and prices are determined by the market force, as well as the development of laws
and financial system. I use it as a proxy for market liberalization, and examine how
the level of market liberalization affects industrial development.
Table 3.7: Market Liberalization and the Border Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foreign Share
Market Index -0.0189∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗ 0.00634 0.0316∗
(0.00844) (0.116) (0.0977) (0.196) (0.00886) (0.0178)
Observations 293 466 466 423 466 466
R2 0.314 0.600 0.445 0.330 0.069 0.118
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.7 shows that effects of market liberalization on east/non-east border gap.
It shows that market index has a negative effect on the share of rural population, and
strong positive effects on manufacturing production, employment, export, share of
production that is exported, and the share of production by foreign firms. Given that
the east counties have a mean market index of 7.15 and the west counties have a mean
market index of 5.54, the gap of market liberalization (1.61) across the borders can
account for 3% of the difference in the share of rural population, 79% of the difference
in manufacturing output, 69% of the difference in manufacturing employment, 83% of
the difference in manufacturing export, 1% of the difference in exporting share, and
5.1% of the difference in foreign production share. Compare the above calculations
with the results in Table 3.2, we also see that market liberalization can explain a
large part of the east/non-east provincial border effect.
3.6 Robustness
3.6.1 Human Capital and Local Public Goods
In the previous section, I use only counties contiguous to the provincial borders
to examine the effect of political borders on the distribution of manufacturing ac-
tivity. The reason is that border counties are similar in geography and culture, so
the economic discontinuities can only be explained by policy factors. However, there
may be some other local factors that are statistically different and may also cause
economic discontinuities. Here we examine two factors: local human capital and local
public good. Human capital is an important factor in determining economic growth,
and if the east counties have a higher level of human capital, they will have more
manufacturing production and employment. I follow Mankiw et al. (1992) and use
students at primary and middle school as a measure of human capital. Local public
good can also contribute to local economic growth. I use length of railway and length
of the paved road as proxies for local public goods. Adding these control variable into
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the equation (3.1), I obtain the following results:
Table 3.8: The East/Non-east Border Effect (with controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foreign Share
East -0.0422∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗ 0.0110 0.0833∗
(0.0119) (0.272) (0.240) (0.493) (0.0214) (0.0418)
ln(hc) 0.0254 -0.491 -0.565 -3.168∗∗ -0.0689 0.0200
(0.0271) (0.432) (0.361) (1.520) (0.0657) (0.124)
ln(road) 0.00438 -0.00914 0.133 0.356 0.0167 -0.0159
(0.00455) (0.112) (0.0829) (0.286) (0.0136) (0.0152)
ln(rail) -0.00461 0.160∗ 0.106 0.0958 -0.00473 -0.000641
(0.00335) (0.0930) (0.0656) (0.126) (0.00582) (0.00987)
Observations 287 283 283 258 283 283
R2 0.640 0.756 0.640 0.478 0.151 0.167
1 Standard errors in parentheses clustered at county level,∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2 human capital(hc): number of primary and middle school students per 10,000 population. Road: length
(in kilometer) of paved road. Rail: length (in kilometer) of railway.
3 The regression equations also control for distance to the nearest seaport, elevation, year fixed effect,
border segment fixed effect, as well as culture (measured by dialect).
Adding these local control variables does not change our main results. The coef-
ficient of the dummy variable East is still statistically significant and the magnitude
is similar to Table 3.2. However, after controlling for the east/non-east dummy, local
public good variables and local human capital variables are not statistically signifi-
cant. The results show that the large economic discontinuities are not due to local
factors, and it gives us more confidence that the border discontinuities are caused by
policy differences at the provincial level.
3.6.2 The “False” Border Effect
Are the effects we found really the provincial border effects? If economic activities
change discontinuously from county to county, we will find economic discontinuity in
the main analysis even if provincial borders have no effect. In this section, I check
if economic activities change abruptly across a hypothetical border. Specifically, I
check if there is an economic discontinuity between counties on the west border and
the other counties in the western provinces, and also examine if economic activities
change abruptly from counties on the east border to the other counties in the eastern
provinces.
Figure 3.10 shows how I choose the comparison groups. I use counties within
100 km from the border but are not contiguous to the borders as my comparison
counties15. In the figure, the red ones are counties contiguous to the borders, and
15I also use other ways to construct comparison counties. In the appendix B.3, I use counties
adjacent to the border counties as the comparison group, and the results are similar.
56
Figure 3.10: Border Counties and Comparison Counties
the blue ones are my comparison counties. The first comparison is between western
counties contiguous to the border and western counties within 100 km from the border
line (but not contiguous to the border). The second comparison is between eastern
counties contiguous to the borders and eastern counties within 100 km from the border
line. In both cases, I run equation (3.1) to check if economic discontinuities exist in
the false borders.
Table 3.9: The Effects of False Borders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foreign Share
Panel A: The Effects of the False Border in the West
East -0.0280∗∗ 0.233 0.198 -0.130 -0.00987 -0.0257
(0.0114) (0.163) (0.155) (0.292) (0.0163) (0.0307)
Observations 453 767 767 635 767 767
R2 0.229 0.450 0.112 0.158 0.164 0.035
Panel B: The Effects of the False Border in the East
East -0.00760 -0.0214 -0.0654 -0.0536 -0.00466 0.00846
(0.0171) (0.245) (0.192) (0.372) (0.0192) (0.0304)
Observations 455 812 812 795 812 812
R2 0.208 0.545 0.368 0.458 0.239 0.180
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Panel A of Table 3.9 shows the effects of the false border in the west. The co-
efficients of the dummy variable East are small and insignificant in all cases except
for the share of rural population. Panel B shows the effects of the false border in the
east. The coefficients of the dummy variable East are insignificant for all regressions.
The results show that there is no economic discontinuity between counties within the
same provinces. The results implies that manufacturing discontinuities across the
east/non-east border are not due to local factors, and supports that provincial level
policy differences cause the east/non-east divide.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper documents the economic discontinuities between the east and the non-
east of China. Using borders on the plain regions, I show that the economic discon-
tinuities are not due to geographic barriers or cultural differences. Further analysis
shows that the economic discontinuities are stronger in the private sector and the
foreign sector than in the state sector, and are stronger in non-mountain regions than
in mountain regions. I also use measures of openness level and market liberalization
and show that both openness level and market liberalization can account for the large
economic discontinuities across the east/non-east borders.
The results in this paper support that subnational (provincial) policies could cause
regional disparities for regions with similar geographic conditions. For an econom-
ically decentralized country like China, it also shows that place-based policies not
only increase economic growth in regions that have the preferential policy, but also
increase regional inequalities.
Border effect is still a black box that needs more research and exploration. This
paper takes a small step to try to understand the border effect. Future work should
focus more on specific policy differences across the border, as well as barriers to trade
and migration.
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Chapter 4 The Ending of the Multi-fiber Arrangement and Its Impacts
on Textiles and Clothing Industry in China
4.1 Introduction
The Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA) ended in 2005. The sudden and exogenous
change of trade policy provides an opportunity to examine the effect of a special
kind of trade liberalization, the removal of quota restrictions. As the world’s largest
textile and clothing (T&C) exporter, China was relatively more constrained under the
MFA and experienced larger export growth when the quotas were lifted. Extensive
research has been done using the expiration of the MFA to test the effects of quota
restriction on export price and quality (Harrigan and Barrows (2009)), the distortions
caused by inefficient quota allocations (Khandelwal et al. (2013)), and the responses
of firms in developed countries in facing the intensified competitions from China (Utar
(2014)). In this paper, I look at how regions within a country respond to external
trade liberalization by examining the regional response of export growth after the
MFA expired. I also examine the adjustments by incumbents and entrants during the
quota removal.
I start by examining the effect of the MFA removal. After the MFA ended, export
of a product to a destination that faced quotas (MFA export) experienced 65.4%
higher increase than the export of the product to a destination that did not face
quota (Non-MFA export). However, the large increase of MFA exports compared to
non-MFA exports only shows up in the coastal region, but not in the inland region.
This implies that the effects of trade liberalizations are not evenly distributed within
a country. Using distance to the seaport as a measure of world market access, I show
that regions with better access to the world market experienced a higher growth of
MFA export compared to non-MFA export. I check with alternative explanations
and show that regions with more T&C production before the quota removal also
experienced a higher export growth of MFA products compared to non-MFA prod-
ucts. However, regions with more abundant labor (lower capital-labor ratio) did not
experience a higher export growth of MFA products compared to non-MFA products.
The results show that trade liberalization has heterogeneous effects on regions
within a country. Recent research emphasizes the importance of internal geography
in determining the effects of international trade. Coşar and Fajgelbaum (2016) show
that trade liberalization leads to regions with better access to the world market to
specialize in industries that the country has comparative advantages on. The alterna-
tive theory based on Melitz (2003) suggests that even within an industry, production
will agglomerate in regions with better access to the world market during a trade
liberalization. Using only textile and clothing exports, this paper shows that the
trade liberalization had a larger effect on the coastal region, even within the narrowly
defined industry.
I next examine how incumbents and entrants respond to the trade liberalization.
I show that export growth of incumbents is not statistically different between MFA
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products and non-MFA products. On the other hand, entrants have a large impact on
the increase of MFA exports compared to non-MFA exports. I also show that most of
the entries are by existing firms expanding their product and exporting destinations
(adders), not by new firms entering the T&C market. The results show that although
extensive margin adjustment are important during the trade liberalization, most of the
extensive margin adjustments are within-firm adjustments by existing firms. Further
analysis shows that existing firms adjust by mainly expanding to similar products
within the same HS2 category.
While there is a large increase of MFA exports compared to non-MFA exports,
the effects of the MFA removal are mostly due to adjustments by existing firms,
not new firms. Recent literature has focused on multiple product firms and within-
firm adjustments during the trade liberalization. Bernard et al. (2011) develop a
model to show that trade liberalizations induce multiple-product firms to expand to
more products and export to more destinations. Upward and Wang (2016) also use
the ending of the MFA and show that the quota removal induced firms to expand
their product scope. This paper, while focuses on industry-level analysis, shows that
product and destination expansions by existing firms are both significant during the
trade liberalization.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the evolution
of the Multi-fiber Arrangement and describes the distribution of textile and clothing
exports in China. Section 3 measures the effect of the MFA removal and show its
heterogeneous effects on coastal and inland regions. Section 4 discusses several expla-
nations for the heterogeneous response of coastal and inland regions to the external
trade liberalization. Section 5 examines firm entry and within-firm adjustment during
the quota removal. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 The Multi-fiber Arrangement and Chinese Textile and Clothing Ex-
ports
4.2.1 The Evolution of the Multi-fiber Arrangement
The Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA) was a quota system that governed the ex-
ports of textile and clothing (T&C) products from developing countries to developed
countries (the US, the EU, and Canada). It was established in 1974 to protect the
textile and clothing industries in developed countries, which had lost comparative
advantages when competing with competitors such as east and southeast Asian coun-
tries. As a result of the MFA, trade of textile and clothing products were kept out
of multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). When the World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced the GATT in 1995,
the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) was signed to integrate textile and
clothing products into the WTO rules. Quotas on textiles and clothing products
were scheduled to be removed step by step in 4 phases. In the first phase, which
began on January 1, 1995, countries had to remove quotas representing 16% of their
1990 import volume. The next 3 phases, which began on January 1 of 1998, 2002,
2005 respectively, requires countries to remove quotas representing 17%, 18% and the
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remaining 49% of their 1990 import volume. Meanwhile, the ATC also requires quota
growth rate to accelerate over the first three phases. At the beginning of the first
phase, existing quotas’ growth rate was increased by 16%, and the quota growth rate
was increased further by another 25% and another 27% in Phase II and Phase III re-
spectively.1 However, countries can decide quotas on which products be removed first
and quotas on which products be retired last. Thus, the first two phases of quota
removal did not cause much pain to the developed countries. But the removal of
phase III and phase IV quotas actually dismantled the protection on T&C industries.
When the MFA finally expired in 2005, T&C exports from developing countries to
the developed countries surged.
China faced stricter quota restrictions than other developing countries under the
MFA. Due to its large economic size and rapid economic growth, the quota restrictions
for China were more binding. China was ineligible for the first two phases of quota
removal until it joined the WTO in December 2001. Quotas on the first two phases
products, as well as quotas on phase III products, were removed at the beginning of
2002. Then on January 1, 2005, the remaining phase IV quotas were removed.
4.2.2 Distribution of the T&C Industry in China
As the world’s largest country in population and world’s largest developing coun-
try, China has a comparative advantage in labor intensive industries in international
trade. Since China’s economic reform and openness in 1978, its export of T&C prod-
ucts has been growing rapidly, and it is now the largest producer and exporter of
textile and clothing products. In 2013, China’s T&C export accounts for 33.7% of
world’s total T&C exports. Textile and clothing industry is also an important sector
of the Chinese economy. It accounts for 14.5% of China’s total export in 2013.2 As
a typical labor-intensive sector, it absorbed 15.4% of the manufacturing employment
and produced 8.3% of total manufacturing output during 1998-2007.
China’s exports of textile and clothing products are highly concentrated in the
coastal region3. The coastal region accounts for more than 90% of total T&C exports.
Among the coastal provinces, 4 provinces in the Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai,
Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) and the Pearl River Delta (Guangdong) account for about 3
quarters of all exports.
Table 4.1 shows that geographic distribution of T&C exports in China. The
coastal region dominated the T&C exports in China. From 2003 to 2006, the export-
ing share of the coast region increased slightly. There is also relocation of exports
within the coastal region. Guangdong’s share of exports has more than doubled from
2003 to 2006, while Beijing, Shanghai, and Zhejiang’s share of exports has decreased
1For example, a product with quota growth rate equals 10% before 1995 would grow at 11.6%
(10%× 1.16) in Phase I, 14.5% (11.6%× 1.25) in Phase II, and 18.4% (14.5%× 1.27) in Phase III.
2Calculated from World Integrated Trade Solution.
3The coastal region are defined as provinces that have coastlines. It includes Fujian, Guangdong,
Guangxi, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. However,
Beijing is also included in the coastal region.
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significantly. In the inland region, almost all the provinces experienced the decline of
export share from 2003 to 2006.
4.3 The Effects of the MFA Removal
4.3.1 Data
The data used are from China’s transaction-level custom data, which record the
universe of firm exports. The dataset has a range of variables including the firm
identifier, 8-digit product code (the first 6 digit is Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit
code), the location of exporting firms4, destination countries, as well as exporting
volume, value and unit price. I only use the T&C export data between 2003 and
2006, because the focus of the paper is only on the removal of the phase IV quotas.
According to the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), T&C products are
defined as those with HS two digit code between 50 and 635. Data on quota restric-
tions are from Khandelwal et al. (2013). During 2003-2006, China exported 1108
T&C products, among which 543 faced Phase IV quotas either in the US, EU or
Canada. Of the Phase IV products, 157 faced quotas in all destinations (US, EU,
and Canada), and 386 products faced quotas in some destinations, but not the others.
A product may face quota in one country but does not face quota in another country.
Out of the 386 products that faced quota in some countries but not in others, I define
MFA products as product-destinations that faced quotas, and non-MFA products as
product-destinations that did not face quota. For example, “Men/boys shirts, of cot-
ton, not knitted” (HS 620520) was subject to quota restrictions in the US and the EU,
but not in Canada. Thus, export of this product to US and EU is defined as MFA
product, and export of this product to Canada is defined as a non-MFA product.
There are 539 MFA products, and 547 non-MFA products in the sample.
The ending of the MFA had a large effect on MFA products than on non-MFA
products. Meanwhile, regions respond to the MFA expiration differently. From Figure
4.1, we see that before the MFA expired, MFA export accounts for about 60% of the
total export in Phase IV products in both coastal and inland regions. However, MFA
export as a share of total phase IV product exports increased to 72% in the coastal
region but only increased to 65% in the inland region. Although the share of MFA
exports had increased in both regions, the increase was much larger for the coastal
region (12.47%) than for the inland region (6.98%). This implies that the coastal
region responded more to the trade liberalization, and concentrated its export to
product-destinations that experienced trade liberalization (the quota removal).
4Location of firms can be identified by both zip code and prefecture code. There are some dis-
crepancies when using zip code and prefecture code to identify firm location. The two measures
reveal same information of firm’s location of prefectures for 87.48% of the observation. I use prefec-
ture code in the analysis because it has less missing values.
5Definition on T&C products can be found on the WTO website: https://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/16-tex_e.htm
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Table 4.1: Geographic Distribution of the T&C
Exports
2003 2004 2005 2006
Beijing 2.613 2.632 2.130 1.928
Fujian 4.764 3.168 3.906 3.560
Guangdong 7.539 7.217 13.958 17.178
Guangxi 0.155 0.107 0.112 0.108
Hainan 0.177 0.113 0.103 0.048
Hebei 2.209 2.105 1.643 1.570
Jiangsu 17.853 19.749 19.453 18.979
Liaoning 1.497 1.344 1.654 1.694
Shandong 8.482 8.254 8.307 7.956
Shanghai 15.131 15.212 12.760 12.288
Tianjin 2.775 2.463 1.938 1.791
Zhejiang 29.476 30.812 28.125 27.665
Coast 92.670 93.345 94.271 94.789
Anhui 1.979 1.889 1.495 1.242
Chongqing 0.087 0.098 0.077 0.071
Gansu 0.164 0.120 0.059 0.040
Guizhou 0.015 0.025 0.018 0.010
Heilongjiang 0.163 0.141 0.151 0.112
Henan 0.796 0.653 0.583 0.564
Hubei 1.115 1.011 0.878 0.961
Hunan 0.375 0.351 0.328 0.275
Jiangxi 0.330 0.356 0.516 0.444
Jilin 0.107 0.073 0.103 0.092
Neimenggu 0.738 0.687 0.529 0.519
Ningxia 0.242 0.254 0.221 0.198
Qinghai 0.080 0.099 0.066 0.048
Shaanxi 0.421 0.300 0.208 0.160
Shanxi 0.082 0.034 0.048 0.046
Sichuan 0.517 0.484 0.396 0.375
Xinjiang 0.048 0.031 0.032 0.024
Xizang 0.028 0.015 0.001 0.002
Yunnan 0.043 0.028 0.027 0.022
Inland 7.330 6.655 5.729 5.211
1 The table shows geographic distribution of T&C
exports of China. Each cell is the T&C export
of a province as a share (%) of the national total
export in a year (from 2003 to 2006).
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Figure 4.1: The Share of MFA Exports in the Coastal and Inland Regions (%)
Note: The graph shows export of MFA product as a share of total export of phase IV products in
the coastal region and the inland region.
4.3.2 The Overall Effects of the MFA Removal
Following Khandelwal et al. (2013), I use the export of a product to a country
without quota (Non-MFA product) as the comparison group for the export of the
same product to a country with quota constraint under the MFA (MFA product).
The identification strategy here exploits the quota restriction variations to different
destinations and identifies the effects of trade liberalization within an industry. It only
requires that the export trends of a product to different countries be the same were
there no quota constraint. Using this identification strategy, I examine if total export,
as well as the number of exporting firms, increased more in product-destinations that
faced quotas than product-destinations that were quota free after the MFA expired.
The regression equation is:
ypdt = β0 + β1Quotapd × PostMFAt + αpd + γdt + ηpt + εpdt (4.1)
where ypdt is the log of export or number of firms of product p exported to desti-
nation d in year t. Quotapd = 1 if the product-destination faced quota before 2005.
PostMFAt = 1 after 2005. The coefficient β1 measures the effect of the quota re-
moval.
The results show that after the MFA expired in 2005, MFA products experienced
65.4% higher export growth compared to non-MFA products. MFA products also ex-
perienced (49.4%) more net entries than non-MFA products, indicating the extensive
margin adjustment to quota removal is significant.
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Table 4.2: The Effects of the MFA removal
(1) (2)
ln(Export) ln(Num.Firm)
Quota× PostMFA 0.654∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.0629)
Observations 4006 4006
R2 0.959 0.982
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.3.3 The Heterogeneous Effects of the Trade Liberalization on Coastal
and Inland Regions
Standard trade theory assumes that a country is a point, thus missing the het-
erogeneous response of regions within a country to trade liberalizations. However,
when different regions have different access to the world market, trade liberalization
can have heterogeneous effects on regions within a country. In the case of China,
the coastal region has better access to the world market and also enjoys preferential
policies compared to the inland region. To examine the heterogeneous effects of the
quota removal on the coastal region and the inland region, I run regression (4.1) for
the coastal region and the inland region separately, and the results are shown in Table
4.3.
Table 4.3: The Effects of the MFA removal: Inland v.s. Coast
Inland Coast
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Export) ln(Num.Firm) ln(Export) ln(Num.Firm)
Quota× PostMFA 0.372 0.167 0.652∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.107) (0.151) (0.0631)
Observations 2499 2499 3985 3985
R2 0.939 0.961 0.957 0.981
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
It can be seen that after the MFA expired, the coastal region experienced a higher
increase in MFA products than in non-MFA products in both total export and number
of exporting firms. Total export in MFA products increased 65.2% higher compared
to non-MFA products after the quota removal; total number of firms in MFA products
increased 49.2% higher compared to non-MFA products. For the inland region, the
increase of MFA exports compared to non-MFA exports is smaller and insignificant.
The results show that the significant effect of MFA expiration on MFA products is
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mainly due to the large increase of MFA exports in the coastal region.
Previously literature studying the regional response to trade liberalization(Coşar
and Fajgelbaum (2016)) has emphasized the cross-industry adjustment and implies
that regions with better access to the world market specialize in industries that the
country has comparative advantages on during the trade liberalization. The results
here shows that even within the same industry, regions with different access to the
world market still respond differently. Regions with better access to the world market
export experienced higher increase in export to destinations that removed quota. The
results show that regional adjustment to trade liberalization within the industry are
important and needs more extensive research.
4.4 Market Access, Agglomeration, and Comparative Advantage
Chinese T&C exports are highly concentrated in the coastal region, and the coastal
region had experienced a higher increase of MFA export after the quotas were re-
moved. It is natural to relate the agglomeration of the T&C industries in the coastal
region with its better access to the world market. The coastal region has both a
better geographic location and enjoys preferential policies in international trade (De-
murger et al. (2002)), thus it will benefit more from trade liberalization. However,
there are some other factors that affect the distribution of T&C exports. New eco-
nomic geography theory implies that firms tend to agglomerate to reduce input costs
(forward linkage) or to take advantage of the spillover effects (external economies).
Thus, reduction of trade costs could induce agglomeration of exports in regions with
already more productions. Meanwhile, factor proportion theory argues that trade
liberalizations will benefit the more abundant factors. And in the case of the MFA
removal, it indicates that regions with more abundant labors (a lower capital-labor
ratio) will benefit more from the trade liberalization. In this section, I examine if mar-
ket access matters for the trade liberalization, and also check if factor composition
and agglomeration economies work.
4.4.1 Market Access to International Markets
Why is the effect of the MFA removal much larger in the coastal region than in
the inland region? One explanation is that the coastal region has better access to
the world market, and trade liberalization magnifies the location advantages of the
coastal region (Guo (2017)). The hub effect (Krugman (1993)) leads to agglomeration
in the coastal region. To test this, I use the log distance to the seaport (kilometer) as
a measure of access to the world market and examine whether regions6 with better
access to the world market also experienced higher growth of export in MFA products
after the quotas were removed.
6I use prefecture as my observation region. A prefecture is an administration unit below province
and above county.
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I run the following regression equation:
yrpdt = β0+β1quotapdPostMFAt+β2DistrquotapdPostMFAt+γrpd+ηrt+εrpdt (4.2)
where yrpdt is export or number of firms in prefecture r in year t that export product
p to country d. I control for prefecture-country-year fixed effect to account for the
fact that prefectures have different exporting structure. I also control for prefecture-
year fixed effect to allow prefectures to have different growth trends of export. The
coefficient of the triple-interaction term DistrquotapdPostMFAt measures the het-
erogeneous effect of MFA removal with respect to world market access. A negative
estimate of β2 indicates that MFA had a larger effect on regions with better access
to the world market (closer to the seaport).
Table 4.4: World Market Access and the Effects of the MFA Removal
(1) (2)
ln(Export) ln(Num. Firm)
Quota× PostMFA 0.809∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.0510)
Distance×Quota× PostMFA -0.0918∗∗∗ -0.0609∗∗∗
(0.0291) (0.0103)
Observations 79499 79499
R2 0.836 0.893
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.4 shows that MFA products experienced a higher growth in export and
number of exporting firms than non-MFA products after the quotas were removed.
It also shows that prefectures closer to the seaport had a larger increase in MFA
products compared to non-MFA products. Specifically, the regression model predicts
that the quota removal increased MFA export by 81% more than non-MFA export
in prefectures at the seaport7. It also shows that the effect of the MFA removal will
decrease by 9.2% when doubling the distance to the seaport. The result in column
2 shows that the number of firms increased 45.6% more in MFA products than in
non-MFA products at the seaport. The effect of the quota removal decreases by 6.1%
when doubling the distance to the seaport.
7Actually, it is for a prefecture of 1 km from the seaport (log distance equals zero). Since distance
is measured as the distance from the center of a prefecture to the seaport, the distance is greater
than 1 km for every prefecture.
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4.4.2 Agglomeration
Prefectures closer to the seaport not only have better access to the world market,
but are also closer to production center of T&C products. There are at least two
reasons for the agglomeration of export near production centers. First, locating firms
closer to the production center saves costs of intermediate input and raw materials
(forward linkage). Meanwhile, firms closer to the production center could benefit
from spillover effects of other firms and a larger local labor market. Both firm-level
increasing returns to scale and external spillover indicate that firms will agglomerate
near production center, and trade liberalization could magnify the agglomeration. I
run a regression model which include the triple interaction term Ouput × Quota ×
PostMFA. A positive coefficient implies that the MFA removal had a larger effect
on regions with higher T&C productions.
To alleviate the simultaneity problem, I use the T&C output in previous period
as a measure of agglomeration force. Output is defined as the log total T&C output
between 2000 and 2002 in a prefecture8. The results are shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Production Linkage and the Effects of the MFA Removal
(1) (2)
ln(Export) ln(Num. Firm)
Quota× PostMFA -2.510∗∗∗ -1.121∗∗∗
(0.473) (0.154)
Output×Quota× PostMFA 0.174∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗
(0.0279) (0.00935)
Observations 72451 72451
R2 0.833 0.887
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
From Table 4.5, prefectures with more textile and clothing productions between
2000 and 2002 also experienced a higher increase in MFA exports relative to non-
MFA exports. A prefecture with 100% higher T&C production between 2000-2002
experienced a 17.4% higher increase of MFA exports than non-MFA exports after the
quotas were removed. The prefecture with more T&C production also had 7.75%
more entries in MFA exports than in non-MFA exports after the MFA ended.
The results show that regions with more T&C production benefit more from the
quota removal. It indicates that agglomeration force (external economies and increas-
ing returns to scale within the firm) also helps to explain the heterogeneous effects of
the quota removal.
8T&C employment data are obtained from Annual Surveys of Industrial Firms of China, because
the custom transaction data have no information about total output.
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4.4.3 The Comparative Advantage in Labor-intensive Industries
China’s rapid development is believed to have been benefited from its abundant
labor. As a labor-intensive sector, textile and clothing industry in China has grown
significantly. Factor proportion theory implies that trade liberalization will benefit
the more abundant factors. Thus, for regions with abundant labors (lower capital-
labor ratio), I expect their MFA exports to increase more after the quota removal. I
define a prefecture’s capital-labor ratio as total manufacturing fixed asset over total
manufacturing employment between 2000 and 20029, and examine if regions with
a comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries (a lower capital-labor ratio)
experienced a larger increase of MFA exports compared to non-MFA exports.
I include the triple interaction termKLratio×Quota×PostMFA in the regression
model, where KLratio is the log of capital-labor ratio. Its coefficient measures the
heterogeneous effect of MFA removal on regions with different capital-labor ratios. A
negative estimate of the coefficient implies that regions with more abundant labors
experienced a higher growth of MFA export compared to non-MFA export. The
results are shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Factor Proportion and the Effects of the MFA Removal
(1) (2)
ln(Export) ln(Num. Firm)
Quota× PostMFA 0.0244 -0.285
(0.552) (0.200)
KLratio×Quota× PostMFA 0.0913 0.108∗∗
(0.126) (0.0453)
Observations 72506 72506
R2 0.832 0.886
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
From column 1 of Table 4.6, regions with a comparative advantage in labor-
intensive industries (low capital-labor ratio) did not experience higher increase in
MFA exports compared to non-MFA exports. Column 2 shows that there are actually
more entries in MFA exports compared to non-MFA exports for regions with higher
capital-labor ratios, which is not consistent with the implication of factor proportion
theory.
4.4.4 Market Access, Agglomeration, and the Comparative advantage
In this part, I include distance to the seaport, T&C output, and capital-labor
ratio in the regression model at the same time, and examine whether the effect of one
9This measure is calculated using Annual Surveys of Industrial Firms.
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factor is influenced by other factors.
Table 4.7: Market Access, Agglomeration, and the Comparative Advantage
(1) (2)
ln(Export) ln(Num. Firm)
Quota× PostMFA -2.550∗∗∗ -1.287∗∗∗
(0.791) (0.290)
Distance×Quota× PostMFA -0.0631 -0.0498∗∗∗
(0.0452) (0.0163)
Output×Quota× PostMFA 0.151∗∗∗ 0.0596∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0112)
KLratio×Quota× PostMFA 0.164 0.160∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.0468)
Observations 72451 72451
R2 0.833 0.887
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
When including all three measures into the model, it still shows that the MFA
removal has a larger effect on regions with better access to the world market (row 2).
The heterogeneous effect of the MFA removal on export becomes insignificant10, but
the heterogeneous effect on the extensive margin (number of firms) is still significant
and the magnitude is similar to what is shown in Table 4.4. The inclusion of measures
of agglomeration economies and comparative advantage has weaken the effects of the
world market access. It is probably because that regions with better world market
access also produced more T&C products, so the effect of market access absorbed by
the measure of agglomeration economies. The results in row 3 show that the MFA
removal has a larger effect on regions that have produced more T&C products, even
after controlling for market access and capital-labor ratio. The last row shows that
the MFA removal has a large effect on regions with higher capital-labor ratios. Again,
this is not what would expect from factor proportion theory.
4.5 Margins of Adjustment
4.5.1 Incumbents and Entrants
The previous sections have shown that the MFA removal had significant effects
on products that had faced quotas before, and the effects of the trade liberalization
10It is only significant at the 15% significant level.
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are larger for coastal regions, which are closer to the world market and have pro-
duced more T&C products. How do firms respond to the trade liberalization? Do
existing firms increase their exports in MFA products, or do they expand exports to
more products and more countries? Or do new firms entering the exporting market?
In this section, I examine the relative importance of each margin of adjustment in
determining the effects of the MFA removal.
I divide exports into the intensive margin and the extensive margin. If a firm ex-
ports a product to a destination in both year t−1 and t, this firm-product-destination
observation is counted as an incumbent in year t. If a firm exports a product to a
destination in year t but not in year t − 1, the observation is counted as an adder.
If the firm export the same product to other destinations in year t − 1, the adder is
counted as destination adder; if the firm does not export the same product to any
destination in year t−1, it is counted as a product adder. If a firm exports a product
to a destination in year t but the firm does not export any T&C product in year t−1,
the observation is counted as a new firm. The market shares of incumbents, adders,
and new firms between 2004 and 2006 are shown in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Share of Export by Margins (%)
2004 2005 2006
Non-MFA MFA Non-MFA MFA Non-MFA MFA
Incumbent 76.64 78.26 70.41 59.66 77.61 74.53
Adders 16.18 14.68 23.82 33.52 15.79 15.98
Product Adder 10.21 8.57 12.16 13.67 14.91 14.97
Destination Adder 5.97 6.11 11.66 19.85 0.87 1.01
NewFirm 7.17 7.07 5.77 6.82 6.61 9.50
Table 4.8 shows that there are more entries in the year 2005, when the MFA
expired. Market shares of incumbents are both over 70% in 2004, when quotas were
still in effect, and in 2006, when quotas had no effect on T&C exports. However, the
market share of incumbents is significantly lower in 2005. For non-MFA products,
incumbents’ share of export in 2005 is 70%; for MFA products, the share is only 60%.
It indicates that there are more entries in MFA exports than in non-MFA exports
when the MFA expired.
For entrants, adders (product and destination expansion by existing firms) have a
higher share than new firms. In 2004, adders account for 16.18% in non-MFA exports
and 14.68% in MFA exports; in 2005, adders account for 23.81% in non-MFA exports
and 33.54% in MFA exports. The share of adders is about 10% higher in MFA exports
than in non-MFA exports when quotas were removed in 2005. On the other hand,
the share of new firms is below 10% and it decreased from 2004 to 2005.
Among the adders, the share of destination adders increased significantly from
2004 to 2005. After the MFA expired, firms became free to export to product-
destinations that faced quotas before. It seems that the immediate response of ex-
isting firms is to export to countries that liberalized quota constraints, as we see
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that the share of destinations adders increased from 5.97% to 11.66% in non-MFA
exports, but increased from 6.11% to 19.85% in MFA exports. In 2006, however, the
share of destination adders becomes smaller, as existing firms had almost entered all
destinations when the MFA expired in 2005.
For new firms, its share of export is about 7% in both MFA exports and non-
MFA exports in 2004. The share of new firms became higher in MFA exports than
in non-MFA exports after the quotas were removed, and the gap becomes larger in
2006 compared to 2005. This could be explained by firm adjustment costs. In the
short run, it is easier for existing firms to adjust product and export destinations.
But eventually, new firms enter and gain larger a market share.
4.5.2 Decomposing the Effects of the MFA removal by Different Margins
In this section, I decompose the effect of MFA removal into different margins:
incumbents, product adders, destination adders, and new firms. I calculated the
export growth rate based on different margins from 2004 to 2006. Non-MFA products
did not face any quota from 2004 to 2006. For MFA-products, their export growth
was not affected by quota restrictions from 2005 to 2006; the export growth was under
the quota constraints from 2003 to 2004; the export growth was affected by the quota
removal from 2004 and 2005. Thus, for MFA-products, export growth in 2006 can
be seen as the export growth rate when there is no quota constraint; export growth
in 2004 is the growth rate under quota control; export growth in 2005 measures
the change of export growth when quotas were suddenly removed. In the following
analysis, I use 2006 as the base year and study the effects of quota constraints and
quota removal on different margins of export growth. The regression equation is
specified as:
gpdt = β0 +
2005∑
j=2004
βjQuotapd × 1{Y ear = j}+ αpd + γpt + ηdt + εpdt (4.3)
where gpdt is the export growth rate of incumbents (column 1), incumbents plus
destination adders (column 2), incumbents plus product adders (column 3), and in-
cumbents plus new firms. 1{Y ear = j} is a dummy variable for year j. I control
for product-destination fixed effect, and allow products and destination countries to
have flexible export growth trends. The coefficient of Quotapd×1{Y ear = 2005} mea-
sures the effects of quota removal, and the coefficient of Quotapd × 1{Y ear = 2004}
measures the effect of quota constraint. The results are shown in Table 4.9.
Column 1 shows the results for all firms. Compared with the year 2006, growth
rate is 58.6% higher in MFA exports than in non-MFA exports. It shows that the
MFA removal has a large effect on MFA export growth than non-MFA export growth
overall. However, growth rate between MFA exports and non-MFA exports is not
statistically different in 2004. For incumbents (in column 2), MFA exports did not
significantly grow faster than non-MFA exports when the MFA expired in 2005; MFA
exports did not significantly grow slower than non-MFA exports when there were
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Table 4.9: Different Margins of Adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Incumbent I+AddCountry I+AddProduct I+Newfirm
Quota× 2004 -0.0672 -0.182 -0.0183 -0.0218 -0.174
(0.164) (0.153) (0.166) (0.171) (0.175)
Quota× 2005 0.586∗∗∗ 0.223 0.588∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.285
(0.210) (0.158) (0.229) (0.221) (0.208)
Observations 2867 2460 2506 2663 2530
R2 0.658 0.761 0.722 0.718 0.742
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
quota constraints in 2004. The results imply that adjustment by incumbents is not a
significant factor for the large export growth in MFA products when the quotas were
removed.11 It also shows that quota constraints did not affect the incumbents’ growth
differently between MFA exports and non-MFA exports. In the next three columns,
I examine the effects of the MFA on extensive margins of exports. In column 3, it
shows that when including destination adders, MFA export growth is 58.8% higher
than non-MFA export growth in 2005. This shows the large export expansion by
destination adders when quotas were removed. However, MFA export growth is
not statistically different from non-MFA export growth in 2004. Column 4 includes
product adders and shows that MFA exports growth increased 62.3% higher than
non-MFA exports growth in 2005. It shows that there is a large export expansion
by product adders when quotas were removed. Column 5 includes new firms with
incumbents. Although the coefficient of Quotapd × 1{Y ear = 2005} is positive, its
magnitude is small and it is not statistically significant. It shows that export growth
of new firms is not significant to explain the larger growth of MFA exports when the
quotas were removed.
Results in Table 4.9 points to the importance of entrants in explaining the effect
of the MFA removal, and implies that adjustments by existing firms explain the large
increase of MFA exports growth.
4.5.3 Entry Rate
Since the effect of the MFA removal on export is not due to incumbents, I focus
on the extensive margin and examine how the MFA removal affects entry rates.12 I
calculate the entry rate in each product-destination from 2004 to 2006. Net entry
11The coefficient of 0.223 is not statistically significant. It could be because that incumbents’
growth is not measured preciously. However, when compared with the results in column 1, the
contribution of incumbent is small in magnitude.
12Firm exit is not statistically different between MFA products and non-MFA products. Thus, I
only consider firm entry here. Results on firm exit can be found at Appendix A.
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rate is defined as the difference of log number of firms between two consecutive years.
Entry rate is defined in a similar manner but excluding exiting firms in each year. Firm
entry rate is calculated as ln(ypdt−1 +entrypdt)− ln(ypdt−1), the difference between the
log number of firms in the last period plus the number of entrants in current period
and the log number of firms in last period. Entries can be divided into existing firm
adding product-destinations, or new firms entering the market. Thus, I also calculate
the entry rate using only adders, and entry rate using only new firm entries. Table
4.10 shows entry rates in MFA and non-MFA products in each year. It is clear that
entry rate, measured in every margin, is higher in MFA products than in non-MFA
products in 2005. But the difference in entry rate between MFA products and non-
MFA products is not significant in 2004 and 2006. From the table, we also see that
most of the entry is by existing firms expanding their product-destinations, not by
new firms entering the market.
Table 4.10: Firm Entry Rates
Net entry Entry Adder Newfirm
non-MFA MFA non-MFA MFA non-MFA MFA non-MFA MFA
2004 0.128 0.093 0.570 0.565 0.498 0.512 0.117 0.087
2005 0.354 0.893 0.728 1.139 0.663 1.048 0.126 0.263
2006 0.074 0.037 0.559 0.568 0.485 0.484 0.116 0.133
Since it is the adders that dominate the entry, I further examine whether the
product expansion or destination expansion is more significant. I calculate the entry
rate of destination adders and product adders. Since firms need to pay costs to adjust
their export, and it is easier for firms to expand exports to similar products, I also
examine whether the expansions of existing firms are mainly in similar products or
non-similar products. If an adder has exported any other product within the same
HS2 category in the previous year, the adder is counted as “add within HS2”; If not,
the adder is defined as “add HS2”. Table 4.11 shows that entry rates by different
margins of adders between 2004 and 2006.
From Table 4.11, we can see that the entry rate of product adders is high for
both MFA products and non-MFA products. The entry rate of product adders has
increased significantly for MFA products in 2005 when the MFA expired, but it did
not change much for non-MFA products. For destination adders, its entry rate also
increased significantly for MFA products in 2005. However, when there is no quota
constraint (the year 2006), entry rate of destination adders became very small for
both MFA and non-MFA products. The last two columns show that entry rate
is much higher for adders within HS2 than adders outside HS2. It indicates that
the adjustment among similar products is more significant than adjustment across
dissimilar products during the quota removal.
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Table 4.11: Growth Rate of Adders at Different Margins
Add product Add destination Add within HS2 Add HS2
non-MFA MFA non-MFA MFA non-MFA MFA non-MFA MFA
2004 0.358 0.348 0.190 0.220 0.456 0.488 0.064 0.040
2005 0.485 0.784 0.269 0.520 0.603 0.973 0.105 0.198
2006 0.463 0.467 0.036 0.029 0.436 0.439 0.072 0.073
4.5.4 Effects of the MFA Removal on Firm Entry
The previous section shows that entry rates of various margins are higher in MFA
exports than in non-MFA exports when the MFA were removed in 2005. In this
section, I examine the effects of the quota removal on entry rates of various margins.
I run the following regression model:
gpdt = β0 +
2005∑
j=2004
βjQuotapd × 1{Y ear = j}+ αpd + γpt + ηdt + εpdt (4.4)
where gpdt is the entry rate (net entry rate, entry rate, adder entry rate, new firm
entry rate) in product-destination pd and year t. I control for product-destination
fixed effect, product-year fixed effect and destination-year fixed effect. The base year
is 2006, when both MFA and non-MFA products face no quota. The coefficient of
Quotapd × 1{Y ear = 2005} measures the effect of quota removal on firm entry rate.
The coefficient of Quotapd × 1{Y ear = 2004} measures the effect of quota constraint
on firm entry rate.
Table 4.12: Quotas and Firm Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dln(Num. Firm) dln(Entry) dln(Adder) dln(New Firm)
Quota× 2004 -0.0308 -0.0327 -0.00183 -0.0516∗∗∗
(0.0667) (0.0408) (0.0390) (0.0194)
Quota× 2005 0.456∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.0661∗∗∗
(0.0652) (0.0415) (0.0396) (0.0198)
Observations 2867 2972 2972 2972
R2 0.737 0.765 0.768 0.725
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.12 shows the effects of quota constraint and quota removal on firm entry.
Column 1 shows the effect of net entry. Compare with the year 2006, the net entry
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rate in MFA exports is 45.6% higher than in non-MFA exports when quotas were
removed in 2005. But the entry rate in 2004 is not statistically different between
MFA and non-MFA products. Columns 2 shows the effects of the MFA on total entry
rate. Compared with 2006, the entry rate is 31.5% higher in MFA products than in
non-MFA products in 2005, but the entry rate is not statistically different between
non-MFA exports and MFA exports in 2004. From column 3, it can be seen that most
of the higher entry rate in MFA exports came from existing firms expanding their
product-destinations. In column (4), it shows that compared with 2006, entry rate by
new firms is 6.61% higher in MFA exports than in non-MFA exports when the MFA
expired in 2005; but the entry rate by new firms is 5.16% lower in MFA exports than
in non-MFA exports in 2004. Compared with no quota (in the year 2006), quotas
constraints (in the year 2004) restricted the entry of new firms into MFA exports.
Table 4.13: Quotas and Margins of Adders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Add product Add det Add Within HS2 Add HS2
Quota× 2004 -0.0480 0.0694∗∗∗ 0.0162 -0.0225
(0.0349) (0.0244) (0.0373) (0.0165)
Quota× 2005 0.240∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0355) (0.0249) (0.0379) (0.0168)
Observations 2972 2972 2972 2972
R2 0.761 0.808 0.768 0.773
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In Table 4.13, I further decompose the entry rate of adders into entry rate by
product adders and destination adders (column 1 and 2), or entry rate by adders
within HS2 and adders outside HS2 (column 3 and 4). Results show that entry rates
for both production adders and destination adders increased higher in MFA exports
than in non-MFA exports when the MFA expired in 2005. The entry rate due to
product adders increased 24% higher in MFA products than in non-MFA products
in 2005; the entry rate due to destination adder increased 22.5% higher in MFA
products than in non-MFA products in 2005. From column (3) and column (4), entry
rate increased higher in MFA exports than in non-MFA exports for both adders within
HS2 and adders outside the HS2, but the magnitude is much larger for adders within
the same HS2 than for adders outside HS2. Entry rate due to adders within the
same HS2 increased 30.2% higher in MFA products than in non-MFA products after
the quotas were removed in 2005; entry rate due to adders outside the HS2 category
increased 9.19% higher in MFA products than in non-MFA products in 2005. Results
in Table 4.13 show that both product adders and destination adders are important to
explain the effects of the MFA removal on the extensive margin of export, but most
of the within-firm adjustments are by adders within the same HS2.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the effects of the quota removal on textile and clothing
exports during the removal of the MFA. While products that faced quotas experienced
a higher export growth after the MFA expired, the effect is heterogeneous among
regions. The ending of the MFA had large and significant effects on the coastal
region, but small and insignificant effects on the inland region. Further analysis
shows that regions with better access to the world market and regions that have
produced more T&C products experienced a higher export growth in MFA products
than in non-MFA products when quotas were removed. The results show that world
market access and agglomeration forces are important to explain the heterogeneous
effects of the trade liberalization on regions within a country. However, I do not find
that regions with lower capital-labor ratio experienced higher growth of MFA export.
The large increase of MFA exports compared to non-MFA exports were not due
to incumbents, but due to entrants. Among the entrants, existing firms expanding
their product and exporting destinations accounts for larger shares than new firms
entering the T&C export market. The results show that within-firm adjustments are
important during the expiration of the MFA.
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Appendix A Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1 Solve the Open Equilibrium
Cutoff threshold and the exporting threshold in the coastal region can be solved
by combining the ZCP curve and FE curve, noticing that ϕ
∗
Cx
ϕ∗C
= (fx
f
)
1
σ−1 τx. The
exporting threshold ϕ∗Ix can be solved using equation (2.14), ϕ∗Ix = τϕ∗Cx. Substitute
this into the ZCP curve of region I, and combine with the FE curve, we can get ϕ∗I .
Labor allocations can be solved using the following equations.
LCM + LCA = LC (A.1)
LIM + LIA = LI (A.2)
LCM + LIM = β(LC + LI) (A.3)
(1− β)LC − LCA =MCrIC −MIrCI + nτ 1−σx [MCpCx(rxCC + rxIC)]−
nτ 1−σx [MCpCxrxCC +MIpIxrxCI)]
=MCrIC −MIrCI + nτ 1−σx [MCpCxrxIC −MIpIxrxCI ]
(A.4)
The first 2 equations are labor market clearing conditions, the third is utility maxi-
mization condition; the last one is balanced trade condition. To solve the system of
equations, we also need to know the price level, the number of firms, and firm revenue
in both regions:
rIC = βLI(PIρϕ̃C)σ−1τ 1−σ
rCI = βLC(PCρϕ̃I)σ−1τ 1−σ
rxIC = βLI(PIρϕ̃Cx)σ−1τ 1−σ
rxCI = βLC(PCρϕ̃Ix)σ−1τ 1−σ
MC =
LCM
r̄C
= LCM
σ(π̄C + f + npCxfx)
MI =
LIM
r̄I
= LIM
σ(π̄I + f + npIxfx)
P 1−σC =MC(ρϕ̃C)σ−1 +MI(ρϕ̃I)σ−1τ 1−σ + nτ 1−σx (MCpCx(ρϕ̃Cx)σ−1+
MIpIx(ρϕ̃Ix)σ−1τ 1−σ)
P 1−σI =MC(ρϕ̃C)σ−1τ 1−σ +MI(ρϕ̃I)σ−1 + n(ττx)1−σ(MCpCx(ρϕ̃Cx)σ−1+
MIpIx(ρϕ̃Ix)σ−1τ 1−σ)
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The system of nonlinear equations can be solved since it has 12 equations and 12
unknowns: LiM , LiA, Mi, Pi, rij, rxij.
Assume the productivity draw follows Pareto distribution: G(ϕ) = 1−ϕ−θ, where
ϕ ≥ 1 and θ > σ − 1. Combine the ZCP curve with the FE curve, we get:
ϕ∗C = [
σ − 1
δfe(θ − σ + 1)
(f + nfx[(
fx
f
)
1
σ−1 τx]−θ)]1/θ (A.5)
ϕ∗Cx = (
fx
f
)
1
σ−1 τxϕ
∗
C (A.6)
ϕ∗Ix = τϕ∗Cx (A.7)
Substitute A.7 into the ZCP curve of region I, we get:
ϕ∗I = [
f σ−1
θ−σ+1
δfe − n(ϕ∗Ix)−θfx σ−1θ−σ+1
]1/θ (A.8)
Exporting probability in both regions are:
pCx = (
ϕ∗Cx
ϕ∗C
)−θ = [(fx
f
)
1
σ−1 τx]−θ (A.9)
pIx = (
ϕ∗Ix
ϕ∗I
)−θ (A.10)
Average profits of firms in region C and region I are:
π̄C = δfe(ϕ∗C)θ (A.11)
π̄I = δfe(ϕ∗I)θ (A.12)
Average firm revenue in region C and region I are:
r̄C = σ(π̄C + f + npCxfx) (A.13)
r̄I = σ(π̄I + f + npIxfx) (A.14)
With all these equations in hand, the system of nonlinear equations above can be
solved. A numerical example is given in Table A.1. Assume that β = 0.3, δ = 0.2,
σ = θ = 6, τ = 1.3, τx = 1.8, f = 1, fx = 1, fe = 2. Assume there are 10 foreign
countries, and they are all symmetric with the home country.
The first row show the result when LC = 2000, LI = 1000; The second row
show the result when LC = 1000, LI = 1000; and in the last row, LC = 900,
LI = 1000. Notice that cutoff threshold and exporting threshold are not functions of
Li. Productivities in the coastal and inland region are not affected by the relative size
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of the two region. Numerical results show that the inland region has a lower cutoff
threshold but a higher exporting threshold; firms in the coastal region are larger and
more profitable. The coastal region has more than proportional share of M industry,
and has a higher percentage of firms participating in international trade.
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Table A.1: A Numerical Example
LC/LI ϕ
∗
C ϕ
∗
Cx ϕ
∗
I ϕ
∗
Ix π̄C π̄I r̄C r̄I pCx pIx LCM/LIM ωC/ωI
2 1.5903 2.8625 1.5357 3.7213 6.4701 5.247 46.5844 37.7783 0.0294 0.0049 7.51 1.066
1 1.5903 2.8625 1.5357 3.7213 6.4701 5.247 46.5844 37.7783 0.0294 0.0049 1.32 1.019
0.9 1.5903 2.8625 1.5357 3.7213 6.4701 5.247 46.5844 37.7783 0.0294 0.0049 1.09 1.012
a LC/LI is relative size of the coastal region and the inland region; ϕ∗i , ϕ∗ix, π̄i, r̄i, pix are cutoff threshold, exporting
threshold, average firm profit, average firm revenue, exporting probability in region i ∈ {C, I}, respectively. LCM/LIM
is the relative size of labor employment in sector M because the two regions; ωC/omegaI is relative real wage between
coastal and the inland regions.
b β = 0.3, δ = 0.2, σ = θ = 6, τ = 1.3, τx = 1.8, f = 1, fx = 1, fe = 2, and n = 10.
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A.2 External and Internal Trade Liberalizations
A.2.1 Trade Liberalizations On the Coastal Region
Combine the ZCP curve and the FE curve: δfe1−G(ϕ∗C) = fk(ϕ
∗
C) + npCxfxk(ϕ∗Cx),
and define j(ϕ∗C) = k(ϕ∗C)(1−G(ϕ∗C)), we get:
fj(ϕ∗C) + nfxj(ϕ∗Cx) = δfe (A.15)
Notice that j′(ϕ) < 0. Since
ϕ∗Cx
ϕ∗C
= (fx
f
)
1
σ−1
PCt
Pf
τx
equation (A.15) is an implicit function of ϕ∗C .
Increase in n:
∂ϕ∗C
∂n
= − fxj(ϕ
∗
Cx)
fj′(ϕ∗C) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Cx)ϕ∗Cx/ϕ∗C
> 0 (A.16)
∂ϕ∗Cx
∂n
= ϕ
∗
Cx
ϕ∗C
∂ϕ∗C
∂n
> 0 (A.17)
So both ϕ∗C and ϕ∗Cx increase as n increase.
Decrease in τx:
∂ϕ∗C
∂τx
= − nfxj
′(ϕ∗Cx)ϕ∗Cx/τx
fj′(ϕ∗C) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Cx)ϕ∗Cx/ϕ∗C
< 0 (A.18)
∂ϕ∗Cx
∂τx
= − fj
′(ϕ∗C)
nfxj′(ϕ∗Cx)
∂ϕ∗C
∂τx
> 0 (A.19)
Thus, ϕ∗C increases and ϕ∗Cx decreases as τx decreases.
Decrease in fx:
∂ϕ∗C
∂fx
= −
nj(ϕ∗Cx) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Cx)
ϕ∗Cx
(σ−1)fx
fj′(ϕ∗C) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Cx)ϕ∗Cx/ϕ∗C
(A.20)
Since j′(ϕ∗Cx)ϕ∗Cx = −(σ − 1)(j(ϕ∗Cx) + 1 − G(ϕ∗Cx)), substitute it into the above
equation, we get:
∂ϕ∗C
∂fx
= n(1−G(ϕ
∗
Cx))
fj′(ϕ∗C) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Cx)ϕ∗Cx/ϕ∗C
< 0 (A.21)
∂ϕ∗Cx
∂fx
= −
fj′(ϕ∗C)
∂ϕ∗C
∂fx
+ nj(ϕ∗Cx)
nfxj′(ϕ∗Cx)
> 0 (A.22)
Hence ϕ∗C increases and ϕ∗Cx decreases as fx decreases.
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Decrease in τ : If domestic trade costs in all countries decrease, cutoff threshold and
exporting threshold do not change. Domestic trade cost change does not affect firm
productivity in the coastal region. If only the home country reduce its domestic trade,
and the home country is a small country so that it does not affect price level in other
country, then decreasing domestic trade cost also would not affect firm productivity
in the coastal region. To see this, notice the exporting threshold in the coastal region
must satisfy Rf
σ
(Pfρϕ∗Cx)σ−1τ 1−σx = fx. If foreign price does not change, ϕ∗Cx should
also stay constant. Combine the FE condition and ZCP curve of the coastal region,
we have δfe = [1 − G(ϕ∗C)]fk(ϕ∗C) + nfx[1 − G(ϕ∗Cx)]k(ϕ∗Cx), then ϕ∗C also does not
change. Thus, decreasing domestic trade cost would not change firm productivity in
the coastal region.
∂ϕ∗C
∂τ
= 0 (A.23)
∂ϕ∗Cx
∂τ
= 0 (A.24)
A.2.2 Trade Liberalizations On the Inland Region
Combine the ZCP curve and the FE curve of inland region :
fj(ϕ∗I) + nfxj(ϕ∗Ix) = δfe (A.25)
The relationship between cutoff threshold and exporting threshold is:
ϕ∗Ix
ϕ∗I
= (fx
f
)
1
σ−1
PIt
Pf
ττx (A.26)
Increase in n:
∂ϕ∗I
∂n
= −
fxj(ϕ∗I) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)(
ϕ∗Ix
PIt
∂PIt
∂n
− ϕ
∗
Ix
Pf
∂Pf
∂n
)
fj′(ϕ∗I) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)ϕ∗Ix/ϕ∗I
(A.27)
and ∂ϕ
∗
Ix
∂n
= τ ∂ϕ
∗
Cx
∂n
.
Decrease in τx:
∂ϕ∗I
∂τx
= −
nfxj
′(ϕ∗Ix)(
ϕ∗Ix
τx
+ ϕ
∗
Ix
PIt
∂PIt
∂τx
− ϕ
∗
Ix
Pf
∂Pf
∂τx
)
fj′(ϕ∗I) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)ϕ∗Ix/ϕ∗I
(A.28)
and
∂ϕ∗Ix
∂τx
= − fj
′(ϕ∗I)
nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)
∂ϕ∗I
∂τx
(A.29)
Decrease in fx: Total differentiate equation (A.25) and use ∂ϕ
∗
Ix
∂fx
= ϕ
∗
Ix
ϕ∗I
∂ϕ∗I
∂fx
+
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ϕ∗Ix
PIt
∂PIt
∂fx
− ϕ
∗
Ix
Pf
∂Pf
∂fx
+ ϕ
∗
Ix
fx(σ−1) , we get:
∂ϕ∗I
∂fx
= −
nj(ϕ∗Ix) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)(
ϕ∗Ix
(σ−1)fx +
ϕ∗Ix
PIt
∂PIt
∂fx
− ϕ
∗
Ix
Pf
∂Pf
∂fx
)
fj′(ϕ∗I) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)ϕ∗Ix/ϕ∗I
and using j′(ϕ∗Ix)ϕ∗Ix = −(σ − 1)(j(ϕ∗Ix) + 1 − G(ϕ∗Ix)), substitute it into the above
equation, we get:
∂ϕ∗I
∂fx
=
n(1−G(ϕ∗Ix))− nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)(
ϕ∗Ix
PIt
∂PIt
∂fx
− ϕ
∗
Ix
Pf
∂Pf
∂fx
)
fj′(ϕ∗C) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Cx)ϕ∗Cx/ϕ∗C
(A.30)
and
∂ϕ∗Ix
∂fx
= −
fj′(ϕ∗I)
∂ϕ∗I
∂fx
+ nj(ϕ∗Ix)
nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)
(A.31)
Decrease in τ : Total differentiate the equation and use ∂ϕ
∗
Ix
∂τ
= ϕ
∗
Ix
ϕ∗I
∂ϕ∗I
∂τ
+ ϕ
∗
Ix
PIt
∂PIt
∂τ
−
ϕ∗Ix
Pf
∂Pf
∂τ
+ ϕ
∗
Ix
τ
, we get:
∂ϕ∗I
∂τ
= −
nfxj
′(ϕ∗Ix)(
ϕ∗Ix
τ
+ ϕ
∗
Ix
PIt
∂PIt
∂τ
− ϕ
∗
Ix
Pf
∂Pf
∂τ
)
fj′(ϕ∗I) + nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)ϕ∗Ix/ϕ∗I
< 0 (A.32)
and
∂ϕ∗Ix
∂τ
= − fj
′(ϕ∗I)
nfxj′(ϕ∗Ix)
∂ϕ∗I
∂τ
> 0 (A.33)
The price level PIt and Pf makes it difficult to determine the sign of the deriva-
tives above. In a special case when ϕ follows Pareto distribution, we can prove ϕ∗C
change in the same direction with ϕ∗I (A proof is in the section A.2.3.). Thus, trade
liberalizations (increase of n, decrease of τx, fx and τ) increase the cutoff threshold
and decrease the exporting threshold in the inland region.
A.2.3 Trade Liberalizations and the Welfare of Coastal and Inland Re-
gions
In models where there is no internal geography within a country, the price level
of the country is determined by the cutoff threshold of the country.
R
σ
(Pρϕ∗)σ−1 = f
Thus,
P = (σf
R
)
1
σ−1
1
ρϕ∗
Real wage ω = w
Pβ
= P−β if wage is normalized to be 1. Thus, real wage is
positively related with cutoff threshold. The cutoff threshold is a “sufficient” statistic
of welfare.
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In my model, however, there is no such correspondence between cutoff threshold
and welfare. Since
Rt
σ
(PCtρϕ∗C)σ−1 = f
Rt
σ
(PItρϕ∗I)σ−1 = f
and
Rt = RC +RI
P σ−1Ct =
RC
Rt
P σ−1C +
RI
Rt
P σ−1I τ
1−σ
P σ−1It =
RC
Rt
P σ−1C τ
1−σ + RI
Rt
P σ−1I
Solving Pi from the above two equations of Pit, we get:
P σ−1C =
Rt
RC(1− φ2)
(P σ−1Ct − φP σ−1It )
P σ−1I =
Rt
RI(1− φ2)
(P σ−1It − φP σ−1Ct )
Substitute Pit with the zero profit conditions,
P σ−1C =
σf
(1− φ2)RCρσ−1
(ϕ∗C
1−σ − φϕ∗I
1−σ)
P σ−1I =
σf
(1− φ2)RIρσ−1
(ϕ∗I
1−σ − φϕ∗C
1−σ)
Differentiate Pi with respect to ϕ∗i ,
sgn(∂P
σ−1
C
∂ϕ∗C
) = sgn(−ϕ∗C
−σ + φϕ∗I
−σ ∂ϕ
∗
I
∂ϕ∗C
) (A.34)
sgn(∂P
σ−1
I
∂ϕ∗I
) = sgn(−ϕ∗I
−σ + φϕ∗C
−σ ∂ϕ
∗
C
∂ϕ∗I
) (A.35)
Next, notice that
fj(ϕ∗C) + nfxj(ϕ∗Cx) = δfe
fj(ϕ∗I) + nfxj(ϕ∗Ix) = δfe
where j(ϕ) = k(ϕ)(1 − G(ϕ)). Under Pareto distribution, ZCP curve is horizontal
and k(ϕ) = σ−1
θ−σ+1 is a constant. Thus
k(ϕ∗C)fϕ∗C
−θ + k(ϕ∗Cx)nfxϕ∗Cx
−θ = δfe
k(ϕ∗I)fϕ∗I
−θ + k(ϕ∗Ix)nfxϕ∗Ix
−θ = δfe
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Combine the above two equations and use ϕ∗Ix = τϕ∗Cx, we get:
f(k(ϕ∗I)k(ϕ∗Cx)ϕ∗I
−θ − k(ϕ∗C)k(ϕ∗Ix)(τϕ∗C)
−θ) = δfe(k(ϕ∗Cx)− τ−θk(ϕ∗Ix))
From above, we can get ϕ∗I < τϕ∗C . Differentiate with respect to ϕ∗C ,
∂ϕ∗I
∂ϕ∗C
= τ−θ(ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
)−θ−1k(ϕ
∗
C)k(ϕ∗Ix)
k(ϕ∗I)k(ϕ∗Cx)
= τ−θ(ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
)−θ−1
(A.36)
and
∂ϕ∗C
∂ϕ∗I
= τ θ(ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
)θ+1 (A.37)
Substitute (A.36) (A.37) into (A.34) - (A.35), since
−ϕ∗C
−σ + φϕ∗I
−σ ∂ϕ
∗
I
∂ϕ∗C
= (φτ−θ(ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
)−θ+σ−1 − 1)ϕ∗C
−σ
< (τ−θ+σ−1(ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
)−θ+σ−1 − 1)ϕ∗C
−σ
= (ϕ
∗
Cτ
ϕ∗I
)−θ+σ−1 − 1)ϕ∗C
−σ
< 0
Thus,
∂P σ−1C
∂ϕ∗C
< 0 (A.38)
Since
−ϕ∗I
−σ ∂ϕ
∗
I
∂ϕ∗C
+ φϕ∗C
−σ = φϕ∗C
−σ − ϕ∗I
−στ−θ(ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
)−θ−1
= φϕ∗C
−σ(1− ( ϕ
∗
I
ϕ∗Cτ
)θ−σ+1)
> 0
Thus,
∂P σ−1I
∂ϕ∗C
> 0 (A.39)
We can also prove that ∂P
σ−1
C
∂ϕ∗I
< 0 and ∂P
σ−1
I
∂ϕ∗C
> 0. Now, the welfare (real wage)
of a region is determined not just by the cutoff threshold of that region, but also the
cutoff threshold of the other region. The welfare of the coastal region will increase
when the cutoff threshold in the coastal region and the inland region increases, and
the welfare of the inland region will decrease when the cutoff threshold in the coastal
region and the inland region increases.
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When international trade cost (τx) or fixed export cost (fx) decreases, both ϕ∗C
and ϕ∗I increase. Therefore, real wage in the coastal region increases, but the real wage
in the inland region decreases. Here, we actually have a case in which (external) trade
liberalization hurts the inland region.
The change from open to closed case amounts to increasing the international
trade cost to infinity. In this sense, when a closed economy open up to international
trade, the welfare in the coastal region increases, and the welfare in the inland region
decreases. The inland region loses from trade and international trade liberalizations.
A.2.4 Trade Liberalizations and Firm Convergence (Divergence)
Using the cutoff threshold conditions of coastal and inland regions:
(ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
)σ−1 = ( PIt
PCt
)σ−1
= P
σ−1
I + τ 1−σP σ−1C
P σ−1C + τ 1−σP σ−1I
= 1 + τ
1−σ(PC/PI)σ−1
(PC/PI)σ−1 + τ 1−σ
ϕ∗C
ϕ∗I
increases as PC
PI
decreases. As we have proved that PC
PI
decreases when interna-
tional trade costs (τx, fx) decrease1, ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
increases during external trade liberalizations,
so is the relative average productivity ϕ̃C
ϕ̃I
.
Under Pareto distribution, πi = δfeϕ∗i θ, so πCπI = (
ϕ∗C
ϕ∗I
)θ. Thus, πC
πI
increases when
international trade costs are reduced. Since
r̄C
r̄I
= π̄C + f + npCxfx
π̄I + f + npIxfx
,
pCx
pIx
= ( ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗Cx
)θ−1(ϕ
∗
Ix
ϕ∗C
)θ−1 = (τ ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
)θ−1,
pCx
pIx
and r̄C
r̄I
also increase when international trade costs are reduced. Thus, external
trade liberalizations lead to firm divergence between coastal and inland regions.
What would happen during internal trade liberalizations? If ϕ
∗
C
ϕ∗I
decreases during
an internal trade liberalization, the difference in firms between the coastal region and
the inland region also decreases. Internal trade liberalizations lead to firm convergence
between coastal and inland regions.
1In this case, PC decreases and PI increases, so that PCPI increases. The result is derived under
Pareto distribution. But PCPI can increase even if not assuming Pareto distribution of ϕ.
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A.2.5 Model Parameters In the Simulation
The model parameters in the simulation example are specified as follows. Assume
firm productivity is drawn from Pareto distribution, with G(ϕ) = 1 − ϕ−θ. Assume
that β = 0.3, δ = 0.2, σ = θ = 6; τ = 1.3, τx = 1.8, f = 1, fx = 0.8, fe = 2; n = 10,
L1 = L2 = 1000.
A.3 Appendix Figures
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Figure A.1: Coastal and Inland Regions in China
Notes: The shared areas are coastal regions. The remaining areas are inland regions. The
triangles denotes seaports. Seaport information are obtained from the World Port Index.
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Figure A.2: Access to the World Market
Notes: The maps show distance (km) of each prefecture to the nearest seaport. The seaport
information is from World Port Index.
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Figure A.3: Opening-up Policy Gradient in 1998
Notes: I use the preferential policy index from Demurger et al. (2002). The policy index are
defined as follows. 3: SEZ and Shanghai. 2: Economic and Technological Development
Zone (NTDZ) and Border Economic Cooperation Zone (BECZ). 1: Coastal open city,
coastal open economic zone, open coastal belt, major city in Yangtze river, bonded area,
and capital city of inland province or autonomous region.
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Figure A.4: Import and Export Tariffs Faced by Chinese Firms
Notes: The tariff data are from United Nation Trade Analysis Information system. The
tariffs are weighted average tariff weighted by import or export.
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Appendix B Chapter 3 Appendix
B.1 Data Sources
In this paper, I use county as the observation unit. In 2007, the four plain provinces
have 510 county-level administration units, including 197 city districts, 84 county-level
cities, and 229 counties1.
I obtain China’s county-level map from GADM database. The map has 400
county-level administration units in the four plain provinces2. There are 54 coun-
ties on the border.
I obtain manufacturing data in each county by aggregating firm data from Annual
Survey of Industrial Firms (1998-2007). There are 508 counties in the sample.
County-level social-economic data are from China County Yearbook (2000-2004,
2006, 2007). The county yearbook only has data on counties and county-level cities,
but not on city districts. There are 330 counties in the sample.
Dialect data are from Liu et al. (2015), who collect the county-level dialect data
in 1986 using Xu et al. (1999). I am able to match with 484 counties in the plain
provinces in 2007.
Data on elevation are from DIVA-GIS. The shape file of rivers is from Natural
Earth website.
B.2 Regression Discontinuity at the Border
The main analysis in the paper use only counties contiguous to the border. In this
section, I check if results change when using different sample and estimation methods.
I first run a parametric regression discontinuity model:
yrt = β0 + β1Eastr + f(dr) + Eastr × g(dr) + γt + εrt (B.1)
where f(dr) and g(dr) are second order polynomials of distance to the borderline;
Eastr is a dummy variable that equals one if a county is in the east provinces; γt is
the year fixed effect. The regression use all counties in the four provinces. The results
are shown in Table B.1.
The results in Table B.1 are very similar to the main results in Table 3.2, indicating
that the selection of only bordering counties in the main analysis is not crucial to the
results here.
I also run a nonparametric model to estimate the border effect. I set the local
1City district, county-level city, and counties have the same administration level. Henceforth, I
call them “county”.
2When a prefecture-level city has several city districts, in the map the city districts are usually
combined into one region. In the map, there are 34 city districts, 261 counties, and 105 county level
cities.
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Table B.1: Economic Discontinuities across the Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(export) Export share Foreign Share
east -0.0526∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗ 1.780∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0698∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.222) (0.189) (0.354) (0.0197) (0.0251)
Observations 2063 3542 3542 3154 3542 3542
R2 0.112 0.535 0.365 0.404 0.155 0.156
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
polynomials to be second order and choose the optimal bandwidth. The results are
shown in Table B.2.
The results from non-parametric estimation are smaller in magnitude compared
to those in Table 3.2. However, coefficients of East are significant in all specifications
except for manufacturing export (column 4). In general, the economic discontinuities
are robust and are not sensitive to the choice of estimation methods.
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Table B.2: Economic Discontinuities across the East/non-east Borders (Non-parametric)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(export) Export share Foreign Share
RD_Estimate -0.0349 1.006 0.861 0.453 -0.0325 0.0964
Observations 1680 1862 2020 1992 2157 2196
Robust 95% CI [-.1 ; -.01] [.43 ; 2.07] [.52 ; 1.5] [-.57 ; 1.53] [-.08 ; -.01] [.05 ; .21]
Kernel Type Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular
BW Type CCT CCT CCT CCT CCT CCT
Conventional Std. Error 0.016 0.277 0.165 0.353 0.015 0.027
Conventional p-value 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.199 0.035 0.000
Robust p-value 0.022 0.003 0.000 0.372 0.019 0.001
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
Order Bias (q) 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 150.448 133.361 147.630 160.921 158.800 160.383
BW Bias (b) 195.163 173.171 187.961 192.871 247.030 219.895
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B.3 An Alternative Method to Construct Comparison Counties
Figure B.1: Bordering counties and comparison counties
In the main analysis, I build a buffer of 100 kilometers to construct compari-
son counties when examining the false border effect. Another way to construct the
comparison group is to use counties adjacent to the border counties as comparison
counties. In the map above, the blue counties are chosen as comparison counties.
Using the same procedure as in section 6, we can check if the false border in the west
or in the east has a significant effect on manufacturing activities. The results are
shown in TableB.3 and B.4.
Table B.3: The Effects of the False Border in the West
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foreign Share
East -0.0250∗∗ 0.229 0.210 0.00315 -0.0102 -0.0269
(0.0114) (0.152) (0.146) (0.792) (0.0179) (0.0349)
Observations 283 507 507 507 507 507
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All the coefficients in Table B.3 and B.4 (except for rural population share in
Table B.4) are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. The results give
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Table B.4: The Effects of the False Border in the East
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foreign Share
East 0.00946 -0.179 -0.205 -0.450 -0.00962 0.00406
(0.0175) (0.248) (0.188) (0.486) (0.0180) (0.0303)
Observations 308 522 522 522 522 522
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
strong evidence that there are no economic discontinuities within the province, and
the economic discontinuities we find do happen at provincial borders.
B.4 The Border effect as a Share of Provincial Gap (Excluding Border
Counties)
In running regression equation (2.2), I use the provincial level gap to explain
border county gap. Since border counties are also used to calculate provincial level
Ypt, there may be some simultaneity problem. Here I exclude counties contiguous to
the borders and use the remaining counties to calculate Ypt. The regression results
are shown below.
Table B.5: The Border Effect as a Share of the Provincial Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Pop. Share ln(Output) ln(L) ln(Export) Export share Foreign Share
Ypt 0.651∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.176 0.337∗
(0.283) (0.113) (0.123) (0.118) (0.145) (0.189)
Observations 293 466 466 423 466 466
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The results in Table B.5 are very similar to the results in Table 3.3. This indicates
that provincial gaps are not driven by gaps in bordering counties.
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Appendix C Chapter 4 Appendix
C.1 The Effect of the MFA on Firm Exit
This section intent to show that exit rate is not statistically different between
MFA products and non-MFA products, whether before or after the MFA expired. I
calculate the exit rate by different margins. Firm exit rate is calculated as ln(ypdt−1)−
ln(ypdt−1− exitpdt), the difference between log number of firms in the last period and
log number of firms in the last period minus the number of exiting firms in this
period. Exit can be divided into existing firms withdrawing from some markets, thus
reducing their number of product-destinations (Reducer), or firms completely exit
the exporting market (Leaver). Thus, I also calculate the exiting rate using only
reducers and the exiting rate using only leavers. The exit rate by different margins
from 2004 to 2006 are shown in Table C.1. From the table, It can be seen that most
of the exit is from existing firms reducing number of product-destinations (reducers),
not by firms exiting the T&C export market. However, there does not seem to be
systematic difference in exit rate between MFA products and non-MFA products
among all margins.
Table C.1: Firm Exit Rate
Exit Reducer Leaver
Non-MFA MFA Non-MFA MFA Non-MFA MFA
2004 0.969 0.986 0.889 0.944 0.033 0.025
2005 0.929 0.907 0.819 0.844 0.043 0.035
2006 1.069 1.210 0.964 1.099 0.045 0.040
I next run regression equation (4.4) to examine the effects of quota constraints
and quota removal on firm exit. The dependent variables are total exit rate, exit rate
due to firms reducing product-destinations, and exit rate due to firms leaving the
export market respectively. The results are shown in Table C.2.
Column 1 shows that the overall firm exit rate is not statistically different between
MFA products and non-MFA product in both 2004 and 2005, compared with that
in 2006. Column 2 and 3 further show that exit rate are not different between MFA
products and non-MFA products for reducers and leavers. Results here show that
quota and quota removal does not affect firm exit behavior.
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Table C.2: Quotas and Firm Exit
(1) (2) (3)
dln(exit) dln(Reducer) dln(Leaver)
Quota× 2004 -0.00322 0.0486 0.00525
(0.0502) (0.0457) (0.0112)
Quota× 2005 -0.0459 0.00735 -0.0120
(0.0492) (0.0450) (0.0113)
Observations 2460 2568 2950
R2 0.843 0.833 0.717
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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